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ABSTRACT
Leadership and Organizational Culture Transformation in Professional Sport
Joe Frontiera, M.S.

Schein (1992) defined organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (p. 12),
and organizational culture has long been recognized as a moderator to performance in business
(Baalthazard, Cooke, & Potter, 2006; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007). The
purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the phenomena of organizational culture change
in professional sport (National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, and National
Football League). Of the 32 teams that met criteria for inclusion, six agreed to participate.
Specifically, leaders (owners or general managers) who had successfully brought their
organizations through organizational culture change, as evidenced by their team’s performance,
agreed to an in-person interview. Modified interpretive analysis was utilized to analyze the data
(Hatch, 2002), from which five primary themes emerged (Symptoms of a Dysfunctional Culture,
My Way, Walk the Talk, Embedding New Culture, and Our Way). These themes and their
respective subthemes were highly inter-related and together formed an initial model for
organizational culture change in professional sport: the Culture Change Cycle. Each theme along
with the overall model is discussed in depth, and differences across sport and role are explained.
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Introduction
Williams and Straub (2001) suggest that sport psychology developed largely from the
fields of physical education and exercise science. However, Coleman Griffith, widely considered
the “grandfather” of North American sport psychology, was a psychologist by training
(Zaichkowsky & Naylor, 2005). Other pioneers in the field, such as Bruce Ogilve and Tom
Tutko, were also trained psychologists. Through these individuals and others like them, sport
psychology has borrowed significant theory from social and industrial-organizational psychology
on a variety of subjects ranging from personality to group dynamics and leadership.
More specifically, applied sport psychology is defined as “identifying and understanding
psychological theories and techniques that can be applied to sport and exercise to enhance the
performance and personal growth of athletes” (p. 1; Williams & Straub, 2001). With such a
broad definition, it is surprising that practitioners in the field beleaguer the fact that there is a
limited market for sport psychology services, and that so few sport and exercise psychology
professionals can make a living consulting on a full time basis (Meyers, Coleman, Whelan, &
Mehlenbeck, 2001). Most professionals in the field have taken a physiological or cognitivebehavioral approach to the application of their discipline, and focus primarily on working
directly with individual athletes, teams and coaches. However, more recently, the field of
“performance psychology”, a hybrid of sport psychology, organizational consulting, and
performing arts psychology, has emerged (Hays, 2006). The term typically refers to the
psychology of excellent performance. Performance psychology has the potential for a more
widespread application both within the realm of sport and in other disciplines in which high
“performance” is required.
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In further exploring performance psychology’s application, it would be appropriate to
examine the possibilities for performance enhancement in sport organizations outside of the
context of developing specific mental skills. There are many avenues to pursue this goal, some of
which lead back to the roots of traditional sport psychology and integration of industrialorganizational psychology concepts. Specifically, organizational culture has long been
recognized as a moderator to performance in business (Baalthazard, Cooke, & Potter, 2006;
Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007) and warrants further exploration as a possible
lever for performance improvement in professional sport organizations. To better comprehend
this potential impact it is necessary to understand both of the archetypal definitions of
organizational culture as well as the multiple approaches to cultural research.
Organizational Culture & Performance
Organizational culture, in laymen’s terms, is often described as “the way we do things
around here” or the values that hold an organization together, yet academic researchers have
struggled to find consensus on a precise definition of culture. Ideational definitions emphasize
cognitive aspects of culture, such as ‘meanings’ and ‘understandings’ (Martin, 2002). For
example, Louis (1985) defined culture as a set of “meanings shared by a group of people” (p.
74). Researchers relying on an ideational approach, for example, would examine the meaning
organizational members attribute to common myths or stories within the organization. Other
definitions of culture are primarily materialistic, and focus on the material manifestation of
ideations. Mills (1988) suggested that culture is the “manifestations of a process of ideational
development located within a context of definite material conditions” (p. 366). A researcher
relying on the materialistic approach would examine dress, workplace environment, hierarchy,
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and job descriptions. Subjectively, the researcher must determine what each materialistic item
means.
Along with multiple approaches to defining culture, there are diverse methods to
approaching cultural research: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation (Meyerson &
Martin, 1987). Studies from the integration perspective assume that all members in an
organization share one consensus of culture, and there is clarity surrounding this consensus. In
contrast, research grounded in the differentiation approach suggests that elements of culture can
be inconsistent. Although consensus of meaning may exist with smaller subgroups of an
organization, agreement may not exist across subgroups or throughout the entire organization.
Furthermore, there may be ambiguities within the smaller groups, as evidenced by leaders who
say one thing and do the exact opposite. Finally, the fragmentation approach takes differentiation
one step further to suggest that ambiguity is the ‘essence’ of organizational culture. Consensus
depends wholly upon the issue in question and can never exist across an organization (Martin,
1992).
Schein (1992) provides a definition of organizational culture that integrates both the
ideational and materialist components of culture and is general enough in its wording to allow
for elements of differentiation:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems. (p. 12)
Schein (1990, 1992) goes on to define the three levels of organizational culture: artifacts, values
and underlying assumptions. The first, or outer, level is composed of the artifacts that an
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organization makes public: for example, a vision statement, company slogan, statues, or even the
way cubicles are arranged can provide indications of the deeper levels of a culture. Values, the
second level of culture, are reflected in how members interact with one another, how members
interact with their environment, and what constructs, such as honesty, integrity or profitability,
members share (Schein, 1992). The third and deepest level of organizational culture consists of
the underlying assumptions. In healthy organizations, these assumptions provide the basis for the
values. For example, if integrity is valued, the underlying assumption may be that only honesty
can lead to success.
After defining organizational culture and its tenets, researchers began to examine the
relationship between organizational culture and performance. Kotter and Heskett (1992) have
made a compelling case that culture does impact performance. More specifically, these authors
outline three general types of culture (strong, strategically appropriate, and adaptive) and the way
each of these cultures impact performance. A strong culture is one in which the organization has
an evident, notable style. A strategically appropriate culture is one that appropriately fits within
its current internal and external environment. Finally, an adaptive culture is one that assists
members anticipate and adapt to environmental change.
Over the span of four years, Kotter and Heskett (1992) investigated the impact each of
these three types of organizational culture can have on performance by analyzing performance
metrics for hundreds of organizations. Specifically, they identified which of the three culture
types was present in each organization and examined the relationships between each specific
culture type and successful outcomes. They found that there was a general positive correlation
between strength of corporate culture and market value (r = .26), net income growth (r = .46),
and return on average investment (r=.31); however, these correlations were relatively weak and
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lacked consistency. After matching high performance organizations with low performance
organizations and interviewing members, Kotter and Heskett (1992) found those individuals in
companies with lower performance felt that their company’s culture hurt their performance and
did not fit their industry, while those individuals in higher performing organizations felt their
culture helped their performance and was a good fit for their industry.
Kotter and Heskett (1992) found that the best performing organizations were those with
an adaptive culture, where the culture encourages continuous adaptation and values change. This
change-embracing culture must come from leadership, and while the adaptive culture must value
leadership, the leadership, reciprocally, must value the core constituencies of the organization
(e.g., customers, stockholders and employees; Kotter, 1990). As a result, Kotter and Heskett
(1992) posed the question “how much does the culture value excellent leadership from its
managers?” They found that individuals within higher-performing firms placed a significantly
higher value on excellent leadership than those individuals within lower performing firms.
Furthermore, those in higher performing firms valued their customers (Mhigher = 6.0; Mlower =
4.6), employees (Mhigher = 5.8; Mlower = 4.1) and stockholders (Mhigher = 5.7; Mlower = 3.9)
significantly more than those in lower performing firms.
Previous research seems to suggest a relationship between the types of organizational
culture and performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). More recent research has investigated other
mediators of the relationship between an organization’s culture and its performance. Specifically,
Balthazard, Cooke and Potter (2006) suggested that behavioral norms within an organization are
reflective of that organization’s culture, or its values and assumptions, and may have a heavy
impact on an organizations performance. The authors surveyed over 60,000 participants using
the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), an instrument that assesses twelve different
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behavioral norms that, either consciously or unconsciously, may be required for members to fit
in and meet an organization’s expectations (Cooke & Lafferty, 1989). Balthazard and colleagues
(2006) found that each of the four behavioral norms classified as “constructive” was positively
correlated with role clarity, communication quality, “fit” with organization, and job satisfaction,
and negatively correlated with behavioral conformity. Furthermore, these constructive norms
were also positively correlated with performance drivers, such as quality of products/services,
quality of customer service, adaptability, and quality of workplace, while negatively correlated
with turnover.
More recently, Smerek and Denison (2007) used archived data measuring four
components of organizational culture – involvement, consistency, adaptability and mission –
from 102 publicly traded companies. The researchers found that both adaptability and
involvement were positively correlated with return on assets, and that this relationship was
strongest in the third year after the culture measures were taken. This indicates that these two
cultural elements may have their greatest impact on performance in the future. Furthermore, all
four of these cultural elements were positively correlated with short-term sales growth,
suggesting that short-term performance may be predicted by these elements.
In summary, similar to Kotter and Heskett (1992), Balthazard and colleagues (2006)
found that organizations that focus outwardly on customers and stockholders and internally on
employee fit and communication have stronger performance. They also provided compelling
evidence that members’ behavioral norms, indicative of the culture, were related to the
organization’s performance. In addition, Smerek and Denison (2007) found that two elements of
culture – involvement and adaptability – had a strong correlation to return on assets in the future
and relate strongly to short term sales growth. Although each of the above studies is correlational
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in nature, the results of these studies consistently suggest a relationship has emerged between
those cultures that are adaptive and organizations that have consistently high performance.
Assuming this link between culture and strong performance exists, the concept and process of
culture formation takes on increased significance as culture formation may impact future
organizational success.
Culture Formation: A Leader’s Impact
Schein (1985) states that the “...only thing of real importance that leaders do is create and
manage culture” (p.2) and that a culture takes shape from both the assumptions and theories of
the founder as well as the organization’s collective lessons from its own unique experience
(Schein, 1983). According to Schein (1983), five principles form the structure of any culture:
relationship to the environment; the nature of truth; the qualities of human nature; the nature of
human activity; and the nature of human relationships. Leaders typically model these principles,
both through what they focus on and how they react to critical events. Specifically, Schein
(1983) suggested that culture is created through the observance of the set of behaviors
demonstrated by leaders that immediately follow a critical incident and the evaluation of whether
those behaviors are effective.
In an effort to determine whether leadership primarily influences culture or culture
influences leadership, Sarros, Gray and Densten (2002) found that certain elements of leadership
impacted culture far more than culture impacted leaders. For example, a transactional
leadership style, which assumes that the leader-follower relationship is a process of reward
(success) and punishment (failure), accounted for 24% of the variance of the cultural aspect of
emphasis on rewards.
Organizational Culture Change
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In addition to driving cultural formation, leaders can also foster cultural change. Before
understanding the way in which leaders serve as facilitators, it is important to first understand the
nature of organizational culture change. Organizations find numerous reasons to change their
culture, from increasing collaboration, initiative, and accountability (Kanter, 2004) to adapting to
external change (Singh, 2006). Inherent in each of these culture change rationalizations is the
basic desire to improve performance. Schein (1990) asserts that three steps need to occur in order
to successfully change culture. First, leaders need to “unfreeze” the present system by outlining
and discussing impending threats to the organization if no change occurs. Second, a new
direction needs to be formalized along with a new set of assumptions; this step is the actual
“change”. Finally, members of the organization need to be positively reinforced when their
actions align with the new assumptions, and punished when they adhere to old assumptions. This
third step is “refreezing” the new culture.
This three-step process is seemingly simple, yet culture is difficult to change. Smith
(2003) reported that in a group of North American corporations that had attempted culture
change, only 19% of managers rated the culture change as ‘extremely successful’. Kotter and
Haskett (1992) claim that culture is difficult to change due to the interdependence between and
within the levels of culture, such as values and underlying assumptions.
In order to successfully alter culture, leaders must address a situation that has previously
been ignored, increase collaboration, and inspire initiative (Kanter, 2004). To emphasize this
point, Kanter provides one of the only examples in the literature of organizational culture change
pertaining to professional sport: the turnaround of the Philadelphia Eagles. Since Jeffrey Lurie
purchased the organization in 1994, the Eagles have embarked on a remarkable turnaround.
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Although they have yet to win a championship, the Eagles have been one of the most successful
organizations in the NFL in the past ten years.
Although there has been significant research into the construct of organizational culture
and change within business, this phenomenon has not been examined within professional sport
other than the above reference by Kanter (2004). Professional sport is simply a business with a
unique product – a team. Due to the compelling relationship between a healthy organizational
culture and strong performance, it is arguable that the lack of success of a professional sport
team can be symptomatic of a larger problem within that organization’s culture. Furthermore,
new leadership is often required to make changes to an organization’s culture. While this leads to
many inquiries that have yet to be explored in the sport literature, this study was designed to
concentrate on one primary question (1) and two secondary questions (2, 3):
1. In what manner do leaders create more of a performance-oriented culture in
professional sport organizations?
2. Are leaders in professional sport consciously aware of the critical elements of the
culture of their organization?
3. What similarities and differences exist in leaders’ efforts to bring about culture
change across organizations?
Method
Participants
Intensity sampling and operational construct sampling were utilized in selecting
participants. Intensity sampling consists of selecting cases that are rich examples of the subject
matter being studied (Patton, 2002). In this case, target participants were owners and/or general
managers who have successfully brought about organizational culture change within their
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respective professional sport teams as evidenced by their team’s on-field or on-court
performance. Operational construct sampling entails the utilization of real-world examples
(Patton, 2002). Therefore, owners and/or general managers from the National Football League
(NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League Baseball (MLB) were
interviewed.
To be selected as participants for this research, leaders had to meet four specific criteria.
First, the leader had to be the decision maker within his or her organization. Because decisionmakers vary between organizations (i.e., owner, general manager), the primary investigator
determined whether the owner, general manager, or both make the majority of organizational
decisions. This was accomplished through organizational research, including in-depth analysis of
articles about personnel changes within the organization. In cases where there was confusion, the
primary investigator called the organization to ask who made most of the day to day decisions. In
one case multiple leaders were identified as decision-makers, and the primary investigator
selected one. The remaining three criteria are as follows:
1. In the NBA and NFL, the leader’s respective team must have increased its winning
percentage by 25% in consecutive years. Due to the high number of regular season games
in MLB, the leader’s team must have increased its winning percentage by a total of 10%
in a two year period.
2. In addition to this increase in performance, the team must have maintained a record that
is over .500 for three years after increasing its winning percentage. For example, even
though the 1998 Boston Celtics increased their winning percentage by .256, they would
not qualify as their overall record (36-46) was well below .500. This criterion prevents
any team after 2004 from being included in this research.
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3. The leader’s team must have had seasons with a winning percentage at or below .500 in
at least two of the three seasons prior to the increase in performance.
The primary investigator identified all potential participants through the use of team,
organizational and sport websites (i.e., www.sportsecyclopedia.com), each of which contained
resources for professional sport teams including history, records, playoff appearances and other
general information. The primary investigator then cross-referenced team records with historical
personnel information to identify both owners and general managers that met the specified
criteria.
Since 1995, there have been 32 organizations across the three sports that meet the criteria
stated above (n = 12, MLB; n = 12, NFL; n = 8, NBA). Of these 32 cases, the primary
investigator attempted to select a representative sample of both roles (general manager, owner)
and sport type (basketball, football, baseball).
The final sample (N = 6) included two owners and one general manager from the NFL,
two general managers from the NBA, and one general manager from Major League Baseball.
Participants’ team information is included in Table 1, and a brief biography of each participant
can be found in Appendix A.
Instrumentation
The interview protocol was developed by the primary investigator and modified by an
expert in qualitative research (Appendix B). The final interview elicits a description of
participants’ backgrounds, along with the recalled culture when the leader arrived, the leader’s
values, change processes, critical events that have required the leadership of the participant, and
the vision of the participant. Interview questions were designed to align with Schein’s (1983)
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five principles that form the structure of organizational culture. These principles along with
questions that align with each can be found in Table 2.
Procedure
Each participant was contacted via telephone or email. In most cases, the primary
researcher had no direct contact with the executive prior to the meeting, as the meeting was
arranged through an administrative assistant. A cover letter explaining the rights of research
participants was emailed to participants once they agreed to an interview (Appendix C). In order
to further inform the interview, web research was conducted on the participant and the
organization. The primary investigator then traveled to each participant’s work location to
conduct the interview. Immediately prior to beginning the interview, the primary investigator
again explained the purposes of the study and risks as per Institutional Review Board
regulations.
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with each participant. The
protocol provided the framework for the interview, while the primary investigator asked various
follow-up questions based on participants’ responses. All interviews were recorded for accuracy,
using a digital voice recorder. The primary investigator also took detailed notes during the
interview. Interviews averaged 59 minutes, ranging from 31 minutes to 76 minutes.
The primary investigator also obtained permission to view facilities in order to examine
artifacts that offered further insight into the interview and an organization’s culture. A simple
artifact checklist was utilized to guide the primary investigator in his observations. (Appendix
D).
Data Analysis & Triangulation
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Upon completion of the interviews, each recording was digitally copied to protect the
integrity of the data. Each interview was fully transcribed by the primary researcher and doublechecked for accuracy. A modified interpretive analysis was used to guide the inquiry into the
data. The purpose of this type of analysis is for the researcher to “produce meaning that makes
sense of the social phenomena” being studied (p. 180; Hatch, 2002). The primary investigator
followed the general format outlined by Hatch (2002) in the interpretive analysis process, which
includes reading the data for a sense of the whole, identifying impressions in the form of memos,
and then coding the transcriptions where impressions are supported or challenged; however,
along with the creation of memos during the first reading, open coding was also employed. The
researcher also attempted to increase his own awareness of his biases and prejudices in order to
reduce his influence to the overall process (Merriam & Associates, 2002; see Appendix E).
In addition, data was analyzed both within case on multiple levels including leader, sport
and roles and cross-case, or across leaders, sports and roles. Furthermore, multiple levels of
coding were utilized. First, open coding, or identifying and tentatively naming potential
categories of the phenomena, was used to initially examine the data. Second, through comparing
and combining codes and examining memos, open codes were separated into general categories.
Finally, relationships between categories emerged as the higher order themes. The resultant
codebook is included as Appendix F.
This research incorporated multiple forms of triangulation. First, six separate collection
points were utilized as each participant was asked the same set of questions. Second, data
triangulation occurred through the use of both interview data and document/artifact analysis.
Document/artifact analysis provided both context for interviews and ensured that participants’
words are reinforced with the items and information an organization chooses to display. Third,
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investigator triangulation took place as a second researcher, who has extensive training in
qualitative analysis, separately examined and coded the data to provide a source for inter-rater
reliability. Disparities in the coding process between the primary investigator and the secondary
researcher were discussed until a consensus was reached. Finally, participant triangulation was
used as each participant was provided the opportunity to offer feedback on the conclusions of the
primary investigator.
Results
To assess the first and second research questions, interpretive qualitative analysis was
conducted. Five separate themes emerged, each of which had multiple subthemes. Emergent
themes included symptoms of a dysfunctional culture, my way, walk the talk, embedding new
culture, and our way. These themes have been organized into a schematic that outlines the
process of culture change in professional sport organizations (see Figure 1), and will be
discussed in-depth in the following section. Textual examples extracted from interview
transcriptions will be provided along with an in-depth explanation of each theme and
corresponding subtheme. In select cases, the primary investigator has included words or phrases
within brackets that will assist with context.
Symptoms of a Dysfunctional Culture
Five of six participants were aware of dysfunctional elements within the culture they had
joined. In some instances, symptoms were tangible, such as sub-standard facilities or a win-loss
record; in other instances they were abstract, relating to attitudes or values. Examples were wide
ranging and have been organized into two subthemes: negative environment and a losing habit.
Negative environment. Five of the six participants were able to identify adverse elements of
their respective organization’s environment, both physical and psychological. Physical elements
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included poor facilities, while psychological elements consisted of the absence of important
values such as trust, honesty and integrity. Additionally, leaders identified values that were not
perceived to be conducive to success, including selfishness, placing too much emphasis on
monetary profit and minimizing the value of players. In two cases, new leaders discovered that
bad leadership had been contributing to the negative environment.
The working environment was very poor, in the bowels of [our] stadium. –
Owner1, NFL
There had been some cultural issues with respect to where winning and where
players stood in the pecking order…the focus had been before [owner] took over
on maximizing revenues above all else. Not that that's not a good thing, but some
of it was at the expense of facilities, some of it was at the expense of efficiencies,
and some of it was at the expense of alienating players. – GM, NFL
Losing habit. In many ways, teams had become accustomed to mediocrity. Across all
participants a losing habit had become the norm, bad decisions were common, and there was
little confidence in the organization. Furthermore, a minimal level of accountability, effort and
communication existed throughout the organization. All of these factors contributed to a low fan
base.
The culture was kind of one where they accepted being mediocre, they accepted
that they were a mid-market club, and you heard that a lot. And everyone
accepted “we’re a mid-market club; our revenues are about halfway through”.
– GM, MLB
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The team just had not been successful for a long time. What transpires when you
aren't successful for a long time is you get a lot of bad attitudes, you get a lot of
“well, here we go again” type things, because you just haven't had any success.
And it was always the glass is half empty rather than half full. – GM 2, NBA
My Way
Simultaneous to noting the dysfunctional elements of the culture, leaders soon let the
organization know that there was a new way to do things. In all but two cases, this occurred
immediately after they assumed their new position. In one case, the “new way” was delayed
roughly one year so the new owner could get acclimated to sport ownership. In another case, the
owner had been with the franchise for his entire adult life. The second major theme, My Way,
was best articulated by GM 1 in the NFL when reflecting upon a key decision during his first
days in his new position as President and General Manager:
I also thought it would send a message to everyone else in the building that this
is a new era, with new people, and a new approach to things and, this is the way
we're going to do it.
This theme was prominently expressed by all participants, and was comprised of five subthemes:
vision, my values, change personnel, grow people, and explicit communication.
Vision. Vision was commonly expressed with the very simple sentiment of winning, or
making the organization better. Additionally, this subtheme was often coupled with the planning
process, or a blueprint for winning.
It's win. Take this club to the top, but do it the right way. Do it by having a good
scouts, who sign good players, who will be passed on to good player
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development people, who would all understand [our] way of playing the game
on the field. – GM, MLB
I hand wrote on a piece of paper five points. And I would read them and have
them with me every night when I went to bed, and when I woke up in the
morning. It was really more of how to become a very good football team. But
with that is obviously a very good organization. Owner 1, NFL
My values. Values were brought to the organization by the leader, and provided a
foundation for future success and a basis for organizational decisions. Values were diverse, and
include honesty, integrity, loyalty, trust, commitment, dignity, professionalism, philanthropy and
team. Many values related specifically to the leader’s belief in how people should treat one
another. Values were often implicitly expressed through stories and anecdotes about past
decisions.
I've always said that people have my trust and loyalty implicitly and will always
have it until you prove to me that you don't deserve it. – GM 1, NBA
I think that people understand that we have integrity and that's the prime part of
the way we operate. We try not to lose our integrity because of some difficult
decisions. – Owner 2, NFL
I really feel like if you can respect and validate the people around you then can
get the best from them. – Owner 1, NFL
Change personnel. Five of the six participants explicitly stated that it was necessary to
bring new people into the organization, individuals who shared their values and were familiar
with their methods. When looking for new personnel, whether it was front-office, coaches, or
players, four leaders expressed that they minimized experience and instead looked at a person’s
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potential, or ‘ceiling’. Considerable risk accompanied the decision to bring in a coach with no
experience, for if the person failed at their task then it was likely that the leader would be
blamed. Even with that knowledge, all six participants had hired a coach with no previous headcoaching experience. Additionally, the concept of hiring the “best people” consistently arose
indicating that a potential employee, whether a player or coach, had to have credibility, work
hard, be innovative, passionate and have a positive attitude.
Once things go wrong in a certain way so long, you know the only way to change
that is to start changing the pieces of the group. – GM 1, NBA
That's one of the management mistakes or hiring mistakes that a lot of people make
- that they put experience higher on the criteria level than they should. – GM, MLB
A lot of it was having to hire key executives that would be the, I guess you'd call
them, the lieutenants of change, the ones that would absolutely make it their highest
priority to be part of the change of the culture and the attitude and of the whole
direction. – Owner1, NFL
Grow people. All participants expressed interest in the growth of those who worked for
them. This growth occurred with employees in their present jobs, when they advanced to new
positions, and when they adopted a new mindset or philosophy. The growth mindset that each
leader displayed demonstrated a long-term investment in individuals working for the
organization and a sincere passion for development.
My philosophy has always been to try and help people do their jobs better. Because
if players don't do well and coaches don't coach well, the team's not going to be
successful, and then you're not going to be successful. – GM 1, NBA
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One of the great joys of coaching or being involved in this business is seeing the
people you work with accept your philosophy and grow. – GM, NFL
Our vision is to bring in good people, and you just promote them, you train them,
you promote them, and you keep them. – GM, MLB
Explicit communication. Simply having a compelling vision was not enough to promote
change. It was critical for leaders to honestly and clearly communicate their vision, plan, and
expectations to both players and staff. All six participants verbalized this sentiment. These
communication efforts occurred either on a scheduled basis or in an ad hoc manner.
Additionally, the coach was expected to act as a critical advocate and mouthpiece for
communicating participants’ expectations.
I meet with the marketing and sales staff and front office staff twice a year, once in
the off season to explain what we're going to do in the off season, and once at the
beginning of the season. – GM, NFL
You try to tell people what you expect and what you want to do and after that you
leave them alone and let them do their job. – GM 1, NBA
I always try to talk to the players four or five times a year. I’ll have a meeting
where we talk about where we are, what we need to do. – GM 2, NBA
Walk the Talk
The third major theme endorsed by all participants, Walk the Talk, alludes to the method
used to implement the plan that allowed each organization to progress towards the vision of its
leader. Stated simply, this is ‘how’ the organization found success. This occurred through a
mixture of daily events and critical organizational decisions.
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You know, you say it and say it, but it's how you do it. You can say things and not
really carry it out, you know what I mean? So we try to do it both ways. We try to
say our goal is to win, and we're going to do whatever it takes, and then do it. –
Owner 2, NFL
Once again, this theme was often articulated through stories that reflected a passion for their jobs
and an awareness of how their actions were scrutinized by those they were tasked to lead.
When I was GM here, I might get home at 11 at night, but at 8:15 I was here, why?
Because the people here in this department, I wanted to show them, hey, I want
them dedicated. It's not fair for me to stroll in at 10:00 but they have to be here at
8:30. No. But that's what you do, you lead by example. – GM, MLB
The participants suggested that this sentiment was often reflected in the players that each leader
pursued:
Even though he's [player] not a very talkative guy, he leads by what he does, he
guards, he does all the little things you have to do to win.- GM 2, NBA
Walk the Talk encompasses four subthemes, including day to day, obstacles to change, critical
events, and artifact impact.
Day to day. Three leaders repetitively acted on a daily basis to communicate their message
and perpetuate the plan. The manner in which the leader handled non-critical decisions was also
important. Furthermore, it was crucial to maintain an attention to detail.
It's really everyday decisions, it's what you do, you try to do things right. – Owner
2, NFL
One of the keys to the success has definitely been an attention to detail. It’s not like
you say, here’s a weight room, or here’s a training table. What are you surrounding
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it with? Exactly what is the equipment? What is the rehab mechanism? Do we have
everything you can have to get a human being to heal? And can we do better? Owner 1, NFL
Obstacles to change. The integrity of the leader’s vision/plan must be upheld despite
organizational barriers that had previously been used as excuses. It was important for executives
to view these as challenges to be overcome rather than legitimate reasons for failure. Examples
included a team’s perceived small market status, lack of a fan base and a harsh economic
environment. Some of the same physical symptoms of a negative culture identified in the
negative environment subtheme, including dilapidated facilities or a lack of a practice facility,
were acknowledged with the caveat that they were no longer a legitimate reason for poor
performance.
Part of it is we had no practice facility before that. We were practicing in the
Salvation Army. We practiced over at the [police station] for a couple years, where
you had a two hour window of your day when you could practice. – GM 1, NBA
What I tried to do was to, to change the culture to the degree that we are going to
win, it has nothing to do with where we're located, we can sell tickets, we can be
successful here. – GM 2, NBA
One critical component of obstacles to change was media and fan pressure. All participants
explicitly stated that the media could be a powerful force and would attempt to derail the
organization’s focus in a quest for the next big story. Both media and fans were sometimes
critical of an organization’s actions, or inaction, as each group craved the “quick fix”. It was
necessary for leaders and organizational members to ignore this pressure an remain focused on
the larger plan.
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There's gonna be a lot of public criticism, and there's gonna be a lot of back biting,
and there's gonna be a lot of second-guessing, and you just have to ride that out.
You know, you just have to stick your chin into the wind and ride it out. – GM, MLB
If you really want to run a successful organization, a lot of the outside world wants
a quick fix and will always go for the quick fix, however they perceive that to be. –
Owner 1, NFL
Critical events. Five of six participants relayed examples of important events that they
presided over. Each was a value-driven decision that relayed to the organization that either new
values existed or old behaviors would not be tolerated. Examples were wide-ranging, and
included changes in the front office, on the field, and with the coaching staff.
The specific event that turned us around was trading Player 1 for Player 2. Player
1 was the face of that franchise, he was much younger than Player 2, at the time we
did it it was a very controversial trade, because a lot of people felt, ‘why are you
trading this great young talent for an older guy with problems?’…[it
communicated] that we weren’t going to have selfish people. That we were gonna
have people that were committed to the team, and it didn’t matter who they were,
that if they didn’t do that, then we were going to get rid of them – GM 2, NBA
[We were] widely criticized that we didn't pick a running back [with the second
pick in the NFL draft]. But if you go back to those five principles, there was no way,
unless there was no quarterback, that we were going to pick a running back. –
Owner 1, NFL
Artifact impact. All participants relayed examples of physical improvements that they had
generated that reflect their values and concern for other members of the organization. Each
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participant mentioned specific improvements, in some cases dramatic, made to facilities that
positively impacted players. More importantly, changes were a tangible example of the value
that the participants placed on players. Each participant was consciously aware that the physical
environment around athletes made a large impact.
One of the real key things was designing this building where the cafeteria is the
center-place of the whole building. It’s right in the middle, purposefully. It’s right
in the first floor. And it’s where everybody comes together every day. And from day
one in here, you had departments that never even talked to each other, barely know
each other’s name. You had football people having lunch with marketing people.
Just the whole cross-pollination. – Owner 1, NFL
We had to have the rocks out in left center field…that’s neat and the fans liked it.
But they were a little too brightly painted, and our left handed hitters complained
and they hadn’t done anything about it. So we had to raise our voices a bit and
finally got some action on it. – GM, MLB
Embedding New Culture
With a steady focus on the plan, each organization eventually saw tangible signs of
success, which demonstrated the validity of the new values and philosophies that the leader had
brought to the organization. Success was experienced through both steady improvement and in a
dramatic fashion, such as a World Series win. In both cases, success helped to embed the new
values into the fabric of the organization. Embedding New Culture is composed of two
subthemes: new success and turning point.
New success. Each participant eventually experienced success with his organization. This
subtheme refers to slow, steady improvement which then induces renewed commitment from
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organizational members. Success was not always actualized in the form of wins, as a team
sometimes noticed improvement that was not reflected in their record. Most importantly, the new
success imparted a new sense of confidence in the organization along with a slow entrenchment
of the leader’s philosophy.
The best thing that happened early on was that we started winning more games
right away, and that's healthy because it creates the sense of belief that what you're
doing is right. And it started to engender confidence with the players and
coaches…so the whole mentality started to shift over to the, the whole thing, ‘it's
the same old thing again’ to ‘oh, this might be something different’. – GM 1, NBA
We ended up having a decent year, not a great year, didn't win anything in 2000,
but had a decent year. So that got people thinking, ‘hey, you know what, this is
going to work’.– GM, MLB
Turning point. Occasionally, an organization came to the sudden realization that they had
significantly improved, or a precipitous event transpired that collectively assisted an organization
form a new world-view. It was possible for teams to experience both slow improvement, as
outlined above, while also having a sudden realization that the newfound success was not
fleeting.
We jumped out of the gate and beat some good teams, and then all of a sudden, we
were, I don't know, 24-17 or something like that and had a chance to make a run at
the playoffs. – GM 1, NBA
The day we moved into the [practice] complex was really one of the real changing
of culture events. And it went from having some of the worst facilities in the NFL, to
arguably the best at the time in terms of working environment. And everybody, from
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lowest level employees to superstar players, it was sort of a ‘wow’ moment. –
Owner 1, NFL
We ended up having the best record in the East [conference], we won over 50
games, we won the Eastern conference playoffs, went to the finals. – GM 2, NBA
In one instance, one participant relayed that a senior executive in his organization was removed
and the impact throughout the organization when they learned that the participatn would be
filling that role:
And everything changed. In fact, it just reached the field, the ticket sellers,
everybody. Everybody said,‘ whoa, we're getting some support here, you know, this
is good!’
Our Way
The fifth and final theme to emerge was Our Way, which was expressed by all six
participants. This theme indicates that a culture shift had transpired and members had a new
‘lens’ through which to interpret the world. Our Way refers to how an organization selected
members, how they made decisions, how things were run internally, and its collective values.
Additionally, this extends to the new vernacular that organizational members shared, as well as
any new traditions that were established.
First of all we require that everyone, we call it everyone who “touches the team”,
share that philosophy. They've got to embrace that [team’s] philosophy. – GM, NFL
Our philosophy is not that we're going to build this organization by trading. It's not
the best way to build it. So we're going to hang on to our guys and all that, and let
our fans connect with the guys now. – GM, MLB
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We sign a player and we talk about our philosophy here is different from…We just
don't just follow a routine, because someone else did something we're going to do
the same. We go with the idea of what is right. – Owner 2, NFL
Our Way consists of three subthemes, including our values, better decisions and independent
thought.
Our values. Expressed by all six participants, this subtheme encompasses the sentiment
of valuing people within the organization, especially players, along with leadership and the fans.
These values were again expressed through the decisions and actions of organizational members.
For example, one participant made the decision to drop a player, but gave the player the option
of where he wanted to go. When asked why he did that, the participant implicitly demonstrated
his respect for the player by stating:
He'd given really good service to the team, and he deserved that.
One NFL owner essentially expressed his value in people by protecting players and coaches from
poor character players:
I feel it’s our responsibility to not bring in players that are like that. And we’ve
made mistakes, but you owe it to the players you have to not bring in bad guys.
Additional excerpts demonstrating the values of people, players, fans and leadership included the
following:
How they feel, how they view themselves, how they view their preparation, how they
approach the things that they, that they have to do to both win and be valued assets
for the franchise and the community is the most important thing. – GM, NFL
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You know, talking to people, and letting them know that you value their opinion,
and you have to say okay, well we don't agree with that, or we do we've got to pick
it up and play it through. – Owner 2, NFL
I think our team does as good of job with the fans, trying to include fans, being fan
friendly, I think we do as good as anybody. – GM 2, NBA
Better decisions. In addition to having new organizational values, the new leader, through
the culture, facilitated better decisions. Five participants relayed that decisions were made
according to the values of the leader and according to the organizational plan. This often applied
to the type of player an organization wanted on its roster. Furthermore, members within the
organization felt more confident in leadership and organizational decisions.
And once you set out on that path, you have to have a plan, and you’ve got to work
that plan, and you can’t deviate from it, unless you’re convinced, and people that
really know, are convinced, that deviation is the right thing to do. And those are the
hardest decisions of all. – GM, NFL
Eckstein was the guy he asked waivers on, and we jumped on it. And, got him over
here. I had a scouting report from one particular scout. And I said gee, if this guy's
right, Eckstein might be perfect for this club. – GM, MLB
Independent thought. To remain successful, five leaders suggested that it was important
for them to think “outside the box”. The organization had to make a special effort to think
differently from the rest of its respective league. Leaders expressed that money could not be the
primary driver behind decisions, and that they had to remain adaptable and open to change while
still following their blueprint.
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Because you don't want get stuck like with the same ideas that were brought in 12
years ago. We got to be that constantly innovative, looking at new ways of
evaluating players, new ways of structuring areas of the operation. – Owner 1, NFL
When these guys are saying that everyone's doing, this dude’s doing this, I say
“they're not [us], we do this thing [our] way” But we're not gonna follow because
some other team does it. If we think its right we will. – Owner 2, NFL
Culture Change Cycle
The main themes and corresponding subthemes have been organized into a chronological
schematic that illustrates the process of culture change in professional sport organizations as
constructed by the primary investigator and the six participants, entitled the Culture Change
Cycle (see Figure 1). The Culture Change Cycle serves to explain the first two research
questions and will be explained in depth in the next section.
Artifact Analysis
Data for each organization, collected using the Simple Artifact Checklists (Appendix D),
was compiled to further triangulate data from interviews (see Artifact Frequency Analysis;
Appendix G). Additionally, artifacts within each organization were documented and linked back
to one or multiple major themes.
Not surprisingly, no artifacts were found that represented Symptoms of a Dysfunctional
Culture, and only one artifact, a “Perseverance” poster in a general manager’s office, was found
to represent My Way. Multiple items were found to represent Walk the Talk, including new
practice facilities, player lounges with pool tables, video games, and TVs and cooks provided for
breakfast and lunch. Numerous artifacts also represented Embedding New Culture, such as a
hallway with only pictures of past Pro Bowl players and framed newspaper articles chronicling
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successes from recent seasons. Finally, artifacts such as an intentionally designed open building,
the placement of a cafeteria in the center of a building, and past Lombardi (Super Bowl) trophies
prominently displayed exemplified the Our Way theme.
Discussion
The primary purpose of this research was to study how leaders in professional sport
changed culture. Secondary purposes were to examine whether leaders were aware of different
elements of organizational culture, and to identify differences in the culture change process
across sport and across roles. Through further examination of the emergent themes it became
apparent that each of the above research questions was closely related. Each theme of the Culture
Change Cycle can be viewed as an abstracted step in the change process and will be supported
by previous research/literature.
First, a new leader arrives and witnesses the collateral damage from past leadership and
poor management (Symptoms of a Negative Culture). Second, the leader implements a new way
of doing things (My Way) and sets out to communicate his values, vision, and plan. The
literature supports multiple subthemes in My Way. For example, explicit communication,
expressed by all participants, outlined the constant formal and informal communications methods
that a leader employed to articulate his plan and vision. From the perspective of individuals who
have taken part in large-scale change efforts, one of the key mediators to successful culture
change efforts is a high degree of communication (Covin & Kilmann, 1990). Specifically,
consistent communication on change efforts had a positive impact on followers. Conversely,
Smeltzer (1991) found that a primary reason for the failure of change efforts is the presence of
rumors, often predicated by the lack of timely and accurate information from leadership.
Additionally, My Values was another subtheme under My Way which describes how leaders
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express their values to those around them. Lord and Brown (2001) suggest that leaders can
influence the values of others explicitly through communication, or implicitly through action.
More importantly, through the process of making their values known, leaders can provide a
normative roadmap for acceptable behaviors within the organization (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998).
Another subtheme from My Way that was supported in the literature was vision. Collins
and Porras (1991) suggest that without a vision, an organization can only react to the future
rather than create the future. Cummings and Worley (2005) indicate that creating a vision is a
key component to the organizational change process. Vision must also integrate aspects of core
ideology (values, purpose) and an envisioned future (dreams, hopes and aspirations). All
participants suggested that their primary goal was to “win”, or “win championships”, but many
added the sentiment to do it “the right way”, suggesting that their values played an integral role
in how they wanted to win. As Schein (1992) stated, an organization must have good reason to
be receptive to a vision. Within each of these organizations, the accumulated frustration of years
of mediocrity may have provided ample reasoning to embrace a new vision.
Third, through both daily and key organizational decisions, the leader repeatedly
emphasizes the new values (Walk the Talk). One obvious assumption of the Walk the Talk theme
is that the leader is present through the change process. In support of this process, Smith (2003)
found that one of the strongest correlates to successful culture change was the presence of the
sponsor throughout the entire process, and an equally strong correlate to failure was the
departure of the leader or sponsor during the change process. Kotter (2007) further stated that
one of the biggest mistakes leaders make in change efforts is under-communicating the vision. In
essence, the day to day communication efforts that the leader makes in the Culture Change Cycle
emphasizes repeatedly that the leader will not be distracted from his vision. In fact, Kotter
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(2007) used the same terminology utilized in this research when he stated that leaders learn to
“walk the talk” and become a living symbol of the new corporate culture. Fourth, the
organization experiences successes, both large and small (Embedding the New Culture). A
primary condition for successful culture change outlined by Gagliardi (1986) was that an
organization needs to collectively experience success with the new values. Finally, a new culture
(Our Way), complete with new values and improved decisions, is crystallized.
Culture Change as a Cycle
The idea of culture change as a cycle is different from past conceptualizations of
organizational culture change. For example, Schein (1990) utilized Kurt Lewin’s model for
change (unfreeze, change, re-freeze; Kent, 2001) to suggest that the cultural change process is
linear and that the resultant new culture is static. For the highly successful leaders participating
in this research, a key component that has allowed their organizations to maintain success for
prolonged periods is the process of introspective evaluation that each goes through at the end of
each season. This process identified procedures and assumptions that were working, and those
that were not. This process suggests that the resultant culture was not completely frozen. This
idea was best captured by one NFL general manager:
And one of the things we always want to do is question on the mechanics of what
we're doing.
The concept of adaptability and an openness to change is critical for continued
organizational success and has been found to be directly correlated to organizational
performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007). Kanter (1983) states
unequivocally that it is not only advisable, but necessary, for an organization to innovate and
change in order to keep up with both internal and external market factors. If an organization
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bypasses this introspective process, it may lead to decreased performance and a cultural fracture,
as organizational members would have evidence that current values are not conducive to success.
Examples of this type of failure exist across the professional sport landscape: once highly
successful organizations stubbornly cling to past formulas for success. Singh (2006) suggests
that this ‘hubris’ is a major reason that organizations become obsolete. By consistently
evaluating performance and looking for ways to improve, the organization ensures that its
methods remain relevant and safeguards itself against hubris. The participants in this study
would suggest that this introspective process occurs within the Our Way step and is inclusive of
the subtheme, independent thought.
To summarize, this introspective process then leads to a new My Way, resulting in a
modified blueprint for Walk the Talk, causing new elements of culture to be engrained, which
then subtly changes Our Way. In other words, subtle changes consistently refine the
organization’s culture and its belief of the “right way”.
Although the culture change within successful sport organizations may not result in
completely static culture, this does not imply that an organization does not have mechanisms in
place that help maintain its present values. For example, Wallach (1983) indicated that
organizations ensure there is a strong match with new employees during the hiring process, while
individuals applying for membership also attempt to ensure that there is a culture match.
However, as members join an organization and old members depart, the culture may undergo
imperceptible changes.
Despite the Culture Change Cycle’s presentation as a clean, step-by-step process, there
can be significant overlap between steps. For example, new values would not only be engrained
in the Embedding New Culture step, but may also occur in the Walk the Talk step as the critical
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decisions of leaders play a large role in disseminating new values to organizational members
(Schein, 1990) In fact, Schein (1990) asserts that a leader’s focus, along with their reaction to
critical events are two embedding mechanisms for new culture.
Differences Across Roles
No differences were identified between the cultural change process as outlined by owners
as compared to those outlined by general managers. One difference of note was that one NFL
owner’s team had the most established culture, as the theme of Our Way was most prominent in
his interview. This can be attributed to methodological errors in the criteria used for
participation. In reviewing historical data, it became obvious that his organization qualified for
this study on a technicality. His team met the qualifications for participation in this study in
2001. In the three years prior, the team had win-loss records of 7-9, 6-10, and 9-7, respectively.
However, in each of the six seasons prior to their 1998 7-9 campaign, the team made the playoffs
and had five double-digit win seasons. This illustrates that the seasons between 1998 and 2000
may have been an anomaly rather than evidence of a poor culture. The historical data, in
conjunction with the interview, leads one to believe that this team’s successful culture had been
long established with a strong tradition, an avid fan base, and multiple Super Bowl
Championship seasons. Additionally, the consistency of leadership in this participant’s
organization was an anomaly as compared to the other participants’ organizations, where
relatively recent changes in ownership had transpired.
Differences Across Sport
One major difference materialized with basketball executives, where the two participants
consistently mentioned players, player acquisitions, and draft picks as significant causes for their
team’s turnaround, more so than executives in baseball or football. Even when asked about
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values, these participants mentioned specific player acquisitions that reflected their values.
Although all involved placed a premium on talent, the general managers in basketball seemingly
placed more weight on the player-personnel aspect of culture change, which fell under the My
Way theme of the Culture Change Cycle.
A basketball team is smaller than both football and baseball teams. A NFL team is
allowed 53 players on its active roster, with 11 players on the field at any given time. An MLB
team allows 42 players, with nine players on the field in defensive situations, and only one to
four players on offense, depending on base runners. In contrast, an NBA roster has 12 active
players, with five on the court at any time. Each NBA player plays both offense and defense. In
fact, one NBA GM stated:
Basketball is a little unique in that respect...because one player - performance wise
anyway, in basketball, - can really dramatically impact a team's performance
because of the small number of players and the nature of the game. Take our team
now. If somehow we could go out and acquire Lebron James for some, without
trading away your whole team, I mean just in theory to acquire a player like that it
would dramatically impact the performance of your team.
Although no literature could be located focusing on culture change and group size,
Dunbar (1996), an evolutionary psychologist, suggested that social complexity increases
exponentially with group size. For example, a manager overseeing four others has to
maintain four individual relationships along with six third-party relationships; in a group
of 20, a manager must manage 19 direct relationships, 171 third-party relationships, and
numerous 3-4 person relationships with potentially competing interests. Based on
Dunbar's numbers it is arguable that culture change may be more difficult and time-
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consuming for a large group (i.e, football, baseball) than for a small group (basketball)
simply because of the greater number of relationships that need to be managed, along
with the greater number of individuals that need to be convinced that culture change is
necessary.
Limitations
It should be noted that the Culture Change Cycle is based on the integration perspective,
which is perhaps the most dogmatic view of culture as it offers little room for ambiguity
(Meyerson & Martin, 1987). Three assumptions were made in the creation of this model, which
coincide with the three assumptions of the integration perspective: consistency of cultural
manifestations, consensus among cultural members, and a belief that leaders create the culture.
Martin (1992) suggests that a single perspective of an organization’s culture could potentially be
misleading. Because only the leader from each organization was interviewed, it was impossible
to learn whether the meanings and values they attributed to specific cultural manifestations were
consistent or shared with other members at different levels. The primary assumption, based upon
performance data of the organization, was that the leader was the change agent and his values
permeated the organization. The only way to verify this is to speak with other members in the
organization. Although this was beyond the scope of this study, it is a potential line of inquiry for
future research on organizational culture in professional sport.
Additionally, the retrospective nature of this qualitative inquiry may lend itself recallerror, which Patton (2002) suggests can be a weakness to qualitative inquiry. The most recent
turning point, as outlined in the methods section, for participants in this study occurred in 2002.
It is possible that the positive changes each organization has experienced could have biased
participants to report the “good” things that occurred and exclude the negative
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As with most qualitative research, generalizability does not apply (Guba, 1978).
However, “transferability”, or the ability to find congruence in a separate context, is applicable
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Therefore, this research is only transferable to culture change within
sport organizations that fit the context of those that participated in this research.
Summary & Future Directions
Schein (1992) states, “the bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become
conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them.
Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to
lead.” Leaders participating in this research all had an acute awareness of the cultural
elements of their organization, with the commonality that each leader’s respective
organization has experienced a high level of success while the participant has been at the
helm. Accordingly, understanding the organizational culture change process could prove
beneficial for sport psychology consultants as it would provide further context for
consultations. For traditional sport psychology consultations with teams and individual
athletes, knowing if an organization is trying to change culture could provide valuable
insight to an athlete’s or a team’s struggles; knowing where an organization is in the
culture change process may provide the opportunity to assist leadership in changing and
embedding new values. Improved cultural understanding may also provide an avenue for
new consultations with organizational leaders in sport beyond the traditional methods of
working with individual athletes or coaches.
Future lines of inquiry into the culture change phenomenon would benefit from
gaining the perspective of members at different levels of an organization, both vertically
and horizontally, and learning whether they share a similar perspective on cultural
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meanings. Players could share insight about their view of the organization’s culture,
providing information that can be triangulated with senior and mid-level management
across departments. An additional area of inquiry could be the comparison of the
cultures within high-performing organizations with those of under-performing
organizations in order to establish similarities and differences amongst leaders of both.
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Table 1. Participant Team Information
League

Year

Team

Wins

Losses

Ties

Win %

NFL

1995

NFL

9

7

0

0.563

Win%Incr Qualify?

NFL

1996

NFL

9

7

0

0.563

0

NFL

1997

NFL

3

13

0

0.188

-0.375

NFL

1998

NFL

3

13

0

0.188

0

NFL

1999

NFL

13

3

0

0.813

0.625

x

NFL

2000

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

-0.188

x

NFL

2001

NFL

6

10

0

0.375

-0.25

x

NFL

2002

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

0.25

NFL

2003

NFL

12

4

0

0.75

0.125

x

NFL

2004

NFL

12

4

0

0.75

0

x

NFL

2005

NFL

14

2

0

0.875

0.125

NFL

2006

NFL

12

4

0

0.75

-0.125

NFL

2007

NFL

13

3

0

0.813

0.063

NFL

1995

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

NFL

1996

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

0

NFL

1997

NFL

6

9

1

0.406

-0.219

NFL

1998

NFL

3

13

0

0.188

-0.218

NFL

1999

NFL

5

11

0

0.313

0.125

NFL

2000

NFL

11

5

0

0.688

0.375

x

NFL

2001

NFL

11

5

0

0.688

0

x

NFL

2002

NFL

12

4

0

0.75

0.062

x

NFL

2003

NFL

12

4

0

0.75

0

x

NFL

2004

NFL

13

3

0

0.812

0.062

x

NFL

2005

NFL

6

10

0

0.375

-0.437

NFL

2006

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

0.25

NFL

2007

NFL

8

8

0

0.5

-0.125

NFL

1995

NFL

11

5

0

0.688

NFL

1996

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

-0.063

NFL

1997

NFL

11

5

0

0.688

0.063

NFL

1998

NFL

7

9

0

0.438

-0.25

NFL

1999

NFL

6

10

0

0.375

-0.063

NFL

2000

NFL

9

7

0

0.563

0.188

Owner

General Manager
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League

Year

Team

Wins

Losses

Ties

Win %

NFL

2001

NFL

13

3

0

0.812

Win%Incr Qualify?
#REF!

x
x

NFL

2002

NFL

10

5

1

0.656

-0.156

NFL

2003

NFL

6

10

0

0.375

-0.281

NFL

2004

NFL

15

1

0

0.938

0.563

x

NFL

2005

NFL

11

5

0

0.688

-0.25

x

NFL

2006

NFL

8

8

0

0.5

-0.188

NFL

2007

NFL

10

6

0

0.625

0.125

NBA

1995

NBA

39

43

0

0.476

NBA

1996

NBA

39

43

0

0.476

0

NBA

1997

NBA

34

48

0

0.415

-0.061

NBA

1998

NBA

27

55

0

0.329

-0.086

NBA

1999

NBA

27

23

0

0.54

0.211

x

NBA

2000

NBA

44

38

0

0.537

-0.003

x

NBA

2001

NBA

55

27

0

0.671

0.134

x

NBA

2002

NBA

61

21

0

0.744

0.073

x

NBA

2003

NBA

x

NBA

0

0.72
0.671

-0.024

2004

23
27

0

NBA

59
55

-0.049

x

NBA

2005

NBA

50

32

0

0.61

-0.061

NBA

2006

NBA

44

38

0

0.537

-0.073

NBA

2007

NBA

33

49

0

0.402

-0.135

NBA

1995

NBA

30

52

0

0.366

NBA

1996

NBA

30

52

0

0.366

0

NBA

1997

NBA

26

56

0

0.317

-0.049

NBA

1998

NBA

43

39

0

0.524

0.207

NBA

1999

NBA

16

34

0

0.32

-0.204

NBA

2000

NBA

31

51

0

0.378

0.058

NBA

2001

NBA

26

56

0

0.317

-0.061

NBA

2002

NBA

52

30

0

0.61

0.293

x

NBA

2003

NBA

33
35

0

-0.012

x

-0.025

x

NBA

2004

NBA

49
47

0

0.598
0.573

NBA

2005

NBA

42

40

0

0.512

-0.061

NBA

2006

NBA

49

33

0

0.598

0.086

Owner

General Manager
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League

Year

Team

Wins

Losses

Ties

Win %

NBA

2007
1995

NBA

41

41

0.5

MLB

78

67

0
0

MLB

Win%Incr Qualify?
#REF!

0.538

MLB

1996

MLB

70

91

0

0.435

-0.103

MLB

1997

MLB

84

78

0

0.519

0.084

MLB

1998

MLB

85

77

0

0.525

0.006

MLB

1999

MLB

70

92

0

0.432

-0.093

MLB

2000

MLB

82

80

0

0.506

0.074

MLB

2001

MLB

75

87

0

0.463

-0.043

MLB

2002

MLB

99

63

0

0.611

0.148

x

MLB

2003

MLB

77

85

0

0.475

-0.136

x

MLB

2004

MLB

92

70

0

0.568

0.093

x

0.586

0.018

x

0.549

-0.037

x

MLB

2005

MLB

95

67

0

MLB

2006

MLB

89

73

0

Owner

General Manager
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Table 2. Reflection of Schein’s (1983) Five Principles in Interview Protocol

Organizational Culture Principle
Organization’s relation to the environment

Schein’s five
principles of
organizational
culture

Protocol Question
Reflecting principle
2b, 2c

The nature of truth

3, 4

The qualities of human nature

9, 2a

The nature of human activity

9, 3

The nature of human relationships

2a

Organizations lessons from critical incidents (Schein,
1983)

5, 8

Kanter’s (2004) three cornerstone’s of success
(collaboration, initiative, accountability)

3, 4, 6, 7

Schein (1990) Unfreeze, Change, Freeze

4, 6, 7, 8

Organizational Culture Change in Sport 46

My Way
• Vision (6)
o Planning (6)
o Vision Win (4)

Symptoms of a Dysfunctional
Culture
• Negative Environment (5)
o Poor Facilities (3)
o Devalue Players (2)
o Selfish (3)
o Bad Attitude (3)
o Bad Leader (2)

• Losing Habit (5)
o Mediocrity (3)
o No talent (3)
o Poor Effort (2)
o Low fan base (2)

• My Values (6)
• Change Personnel (5)
o Best People (5)
o Ceiling (2)
o Take Risks (4)

• Grow People (4)
o Empower (4)

• Explicit Communication (6)
o Honest to players (4)
o Coach Extension (3)

Our Way (5)
• Our values
o Players (5)
o People (6)
o Fans (2)
 Fan connections (5)
 Fan Needs (3)
o Leadership (5)

• Better Decisions (5)
• Independent Thought (4)
Figure 1. Culture Change Cycle

o Not about money (3)
o Adaptable (3)
o Open to change (3)

Walk the Talk (6)
• Day to Day (3)
• Obstacles to Change (5)
 Media Pressure (4)

o Repetition (4)
• Critical Events (5)
• Artifact Impact (6)

Embedding New Culture(5)
• Turning Point (5)
• New Success (6)
o Buy-In (4)
o Confidence (3)
o Engrained Philosophy (3)
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Appendix A
Brief Participant Biography
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Note: Content redacted as information would identify participants.
Dan Rooney
Dan Rooney was born on January 20, 1932. Although Dan never played
professional football, he has been involved with the game at the professional level
throughout his life, as his father owned the Pittsburgh Steelers. Dan first became
president of the Steelers’ organization in 1975 and maintained that position until 2003,
when he gave day-to-day operations to his son, Art.
The Steelers qualified to be in this study in 2001. In the three seasons prior to
their turn around, the Steelers accrued at 22-26 record. Since the turnaround, the Steelers
have earned a 73-38 record, and appeared in five of the seven playoffs, along with one
AFC Championship and one Super Bowl Championship.
Rooney has been one of the most active owners in the NFL. He has served on
numerous committees, and has an unmatched historical perspective of the league and the
challenges that it has overcome.
Bill Stoneman
Bill Stoneman, born on April 7, 1944, had a successful Major League career from
1967-1974 with the Cubs, Angels and Expos. Career highlights include two no-hitters
while with the Expos. After his career was cut short by injuries, Mr. Stoneman spent a
decade as a financial analyst in Canada. Convinced by Montreal Expos ownership to
return to the game, Stoneman left Montreal and took the general manager position with
the Los Angeles Angels. While there, Stoneman hired Mike Scioscia and built the 2002
World Series team, while transforming the Angels into a sustained winner.
The Angels turnaround occurred in 2002. In the three years prior, the Angels had
a 227-259 win-loss record. In the ten years prior to arriving, the Angels held a 734-821
win loss record. In the five years following the turnaround, the Angels have 452-358
record, and have been in the playoffs three times with three league championships and
one World Series title.
Geoff Petrie
Geoff Petrie was born April 17, 1948. After graduating from Princeton, Petrie was
drafted by the Portland Trail Blazers and played in the NBA from 1970-1976. When his
playing career ended, Petrie held both coaching and general management positions with
the Blazers. When the Sacramento general manager position opened in 1995, Petrie
moved South and began rebuilding the Sacramento Kings into a perennial contender.
The Sacramento Kings turnaround occurred in 1999. In the three years prior to the
turnaround, the Kings were a pedestrian 127-146. In the ten years prior, the Kings were
an awful 323-524, one of the worst records in the NBA. In the season prior to the
turnaround, the Kings were 27-55. In the nine seasons since, the Kings are 428-278, and
have been in the playoffs eight times. Petrie has been awarded the NBA Executive of the
Year twice for his work (1998-99, 2000-2001), and is currently in the midst of another
rebuilding project with the Kings.
Rod Thorn
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Born May 23, 1941, Rod Thorn left West Virginia University early after being
drafted by the Washington Bullets in 1963. His professional career lasted until 1971 and
had stops in St. Louis, Detroit and Seattle. Thorn was briefly involved as an assistant
coach for both the NBA and the ABA prior to taking the general manager position with
the Chicago Bulls. In his final season with the Bulls, Thorn drafted Michael Jordan out of
North Carolina which propelled the Bulls into an era of dominance seldom seen in the
NBA.
After working at league headquarters for over a decade, Thorn took the General
Manager position in New Jersey in 2000. The Nets turnaround came in 2002 shortly after
Thorn’s arrival. In the three years prior to the turnaround, the Nets accrued a 73-141
record. In the ten years prior, the Nets were 330-458. In 2001, the Nets were 26-56.
Thorn made a series of moves, including trading Stephon Marbury for Jason Kidd and
drafting Kenyon Martin with the first pick in the 2001 draft. In the six seasons since their
turnaround, the Nets are 280-212 and have been in the playoffs all six seasons. They have
earned two Eastern Conference Championships and appeared in the NBA Finals twice,
falling short in their ultimate goal to superior Western Conference teams. Thorn earned
the NBA Executive of the Year title in 2001-2002.
Bill Polian
At 66, Bill Polian is regarded as one of the premier General Managers in the NFL.
Polian orchestrated the Bills famous run to four consecutive Super Bowls prior to taking
a position with the Carolina Panthers in 1995, then a first year expansion franchise.
Polian built the Panthers into the most successful expansion franchise in the history of the
NFL, as the team played for the NFC Championship during their second season. In 1997,
Polian decided to leave the Panthers and join the Indianapolis Colts.
The Colts turnaround occurred in 1999. In the three years prior to the shift, the
Colts were 15-33. Even worse, in the ten years prior to the shift, the Colts were 61-99.
Since 1999, the Colts have accrued a 102-42 record, and have consistently been in the
hunt for a Super Bowl. In eight of the nine seasons, the Colts have been in the playoffs.
They have appeared in the AFC Championship game twice; after their victory over the
Patriots in 2007, they went on to win Super Bowl XLI.
Polian has won the NFL Executive of the Year five times (1988, 1991, 1995,
1996, 1999). He is known for choosing Peyton Manning over Ryan Leaf in the 1998
draft, hired Tony Dungy, and is currently a member of the NFL Competition Committee.
Jeffrey Lurie
Jeffrey Lurie, born in 1951, purchased the Philadelphia Eagles in 1994 for $195
million. The Eagles are now estimated to be worth over $1 billion. Prior to his entry into
the NFL, Lurie owned a Hollywood production company called Chestnut Hill
Productions.
The Eagles turnaround came in 2000. In the three years prior to the shift, the
Eagles were 14-33, and it was not uncommon to see Eagles fans with paper bags over
their heads. In the ten years prior to the shift, the Eagles were just over .500 at 80-73. In
the eight seasons since 2000, the Eagles are 83-45, and have represented Philadelphia in
the playoffs six times. They have one NFC Championship in that time, and one Super
Bowl appearance.
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Lurie has his PhD in Social Policy from Brandeis University. Prior to his life in
Hollywood, Lurie was an adjunct professor at Boston University. He was voted NFL
Owner of the Year in 1995.
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Appendix B
Interview Protocol
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Script for Study
Good morning/afternoon/evening, thank you for participating in this research study. The
purpose of the study is to determine how executives in professional sport have
successfully brought their franchises through culture change. I would like to audiotape
this interview in order to accurately represent what you say; may I have your permission
to tape this interview? Before we begin I want to make sure you understand the
following:
•
•

Because of these questions, and the high-profile nature of professional sport, your
name may be disclosed.
Your participation is entirely voluntary, you can choose to stop the interview at any
time and you do not have to answer every question.

Thank you again for your willingness to participate in this study.
1. Tell me about your background. How did you get to where you are now?
2. Describe the values in this organization when you arrived?
a. How did people treat one another?
b. What was the organizations relationship with the fans?
c. What was the organizations relationship with the players?
3. How was the culture affecting performance?
4. How did you communicate that change was necessary?
5. What were other [organizational decision-makers] perceptions of the changes that
needed to be made
6. Looking back over the early phase of your tenure in this position, what would you
describe as the critical events that required you to demonstrate your leadership
and your values? How did you deal with these events?
7. What was your vision for this organization?
8. How did you communicate that vision to others?
 Those you work with
 Athletes
 Fans
 League
9. Can you describe some early successes that you believe were able to persuade the
rest of the organization that your vision was realistic?
10. How are your values now reflected in this organization?
11. Can you point to any specific physical changes/documents that can be attributed
to you?
12. Is there anything I haven’t asked about that you think I should know?
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Appendix C
Cover Letter to Participants
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Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The purpose of this research is to
gather information about leadership and organizational culture change in professional
sport. I am conducting this research as a final requirement to achieve my PhD in Sport &
Exercise Psychology. The interview contains questions about your experiences, as a
leader, in implementing culture change throughout an organization. This interview will
take approximately 1-1.5 hours to complete. Your participation is voluntary and you do
not have to answer every question. You may also stop your participation at any time
without penalty.
As a public figure, there is no guarantee of confidentiality, as it is likely identifying
information will be provided by you in the interview. If you have questions about the
study, you may contact Joe Frontiera at (304) 685-6522. For information about your
rights as a research subject, you may call the Office of Research Compliance at (304)
293-7073. West Virginia University’s IRB acknowledgement of this study is on file.
Thank you for your participation in this important project.
Sincerely,

Joe Frontiera, M.S.
jfrontie@mix.wvu.edu
Sport & Exercise Psychology Doctoral Student
West Virginia University
School of Physical Education
P.O. Box 6116
Morgantown, WV 26506

Jack Watson, Ph.D
Jack.watson@mail.wvu.edu
Associate Professor, Dissertation Chair
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Appendix D
Simple Artifact Checklist
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Item

Yes No

Comments

Stadium

Practice Facility

Locker Room

Coach’s Offices

Executives Offices

Cafeteria

Player Lounge

Strength &
Conditioning Room
Prominent Quotes
On Display
Quotes on Display

Statues/Busts

On Display

On Display

Team___________________________________
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Appendix E
Researcher’s Bias of Organizational Culture
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At a relatively young age, I have been a part of both productive and exciting
organizational cultures, as well as stagnant, de-motivating organizational cultures. My
first job after college was with a mid-size technology company. There, the environment
was invigorating. I was able to learn on a daily basis, my colleagues were consistently
supportive, and the management continually communicated successes, new product
launches, and they were able to foster an environment of healthy competition. We
consistently interacted with the management at different regional and national events. It
was obvious they valued our opinions and contributions, as our suggestions were often
made policy. Additionally, our organization took a consultative sales approach, one in
which we valued the needs of our customers and tried to meet those needs. If we
couldn’t, we maintained the relationship but suggested they go in a different direction.
About one year into my tenure, the mid-size company I started with was bought
by WorldCom. At the time, WorldCom had been making many acquisitions in order to
bolster its technological capabilities and revenue stream. However, even at my level, it
was obvious that there was a great deal of in-fighting occurring on a regular basis.
Individuals within this conglomerate organization were striving to maintain the power
they held in their former organizations, while at the same time trying to meet the
expectations of unrealistic quotas and demands from upper-management. Additionally,
WorldCom wanted its sales associates to push their products hard, regardless of the needs
of their customers. Their sales force reflected this attitude, and it was often personally
and professionally embarrassing to go on joint sales calls with WorldCom
representatives.
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The once close office that I had started with began to disintegrate. The
competitive, invigorating environment that we had all thrived upon would not return.
Individuals began working fewer hours, and often were involved in less productive
activities while in the office. The amount of “process paperwork” grew exponentially.
The sense of control that we had once felt about our own destiny within the organization
was gone. I, along with others, felt powerless. My opinion was not valued, and my
contributions were not recognized. We continually heard how well our new organization
was doing, but these accomplishments rang false, so we assumed the success was coming
from other areas of this $30 billion dollar company. Rarely did we see or hear from
management. Instead, we heard horror stories from those who were forced to deal with
management. Where our motivation was once competition, it was now fear.
Only after I departed did I learn that WorldCom was under investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 2002, the company was forced to declare
bankruptcy – the largest filing in the history of the US. Both the founder and CFO were
convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy, among other charges.
The contrasts of these two cultures helped shape my view of both positive and
negative cultures. A positive culture is one which all contributors’ opinions are valued;
employees feel empowered to share their ideas; employees are consistently learning and
developing; and there is cross-communication throughout levels and divisions of the
organization. A negative culture is one in which only a minority feel empowered;
employees count the hours of the day until its time to punch out; communication is topdown; and employees rarely take initiative or go above the standard call of duty as they
know the risks far outweigh the benefits.
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These are my own biases, and it is critical for me to remain cognizant of these
biases throughout the interview process and the data evaluation process.
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Appendix F
Codebook
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Appendix G
Artifact Frequency Analysis
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Artifact Frequency Analysis
Item
Stadium

Team 1

Team 2

Team 3

Team 4

Team 5

Team 6

Total

X*

X

X*

X*

X**

X*

6/6

X*

X*

X*

X**

X*

5/6

Practice Facility

Locker Room

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

Coach’s Offices

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

Executives Offices

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

Cafeteria

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

Player Lounge

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

Strength &
Conditioning Room

X

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

X

X

X

X

X

5/6

X

X

X

X

X

6/6

X

1/6

X

6/6

Prominent Quotes
On Display
Quotes on Display

X

Statues/Busts

Rehab Facilities

X

X

On Display

* Indicates facility built since 2000
** Indicates plans to build new facility

X

X

X
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Specific Links to the Culture Change Cycle Model
Team 1
Artifact

Notes

Locker Room

Improved lighting, new carpet

x

Stadium

Repainted rocks for left-handed hitters

x

Quotes

Framed newspapers from recent seasons

x

x

On Display

Wall of Fame – mostly recent players

x

x

Team 2
Artifact

Notes

Prac. facility

Two full courts, jersey of past greats

Prac. facility

Separate media area

Player lounge

Pool table, video games, tv

x

x

Rehab

Steam room, spa, rehab pool

x

x

Quotes

“It’s not about you”, “Thank Him”

x

x

Team 3
Artifact

Notes

Prac. Facility

Indoor field, two outdoor fields, 2002

x

x

Locker Room

Moonroof, natural light, ground floor

x

x

x

Cafeteria

Middle of building, open communication

x

x

x

Quotes

Rosa Parks, MLK, J. Salk

x

x

Rehab

Top of the line equipment

x

x

SDC

SDC

MW

MW

WTT ENC OW
x

x
x

WTT ENC OW
x
x

SDC

MW

WTT ENC OW
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Team 4
Artifact

Notes

SDC

MW

WTT ENC OW

Exec Offices
Display
Prac. facility

Perseverance poster

Locker room

No media access, new ice baths,

Cafeteria

Serve breakfast/lunch to players, family

New construct

Player lounge

Extend executive and coaching offices,
something new every year
Pro-Bowl hall: All pro-bowl players in
history
Super Bowl pics, leather chairs, foozball

Team 5
Artifact

Notes

Pract Facility

Well lit, banners, EC Champs

x

On display

Eastern conference champs

x

Cafeteria

Breakfast and lunch orders taken by cook

x

On display

NJ Nets “Plan to Win”

Quotes

Ali quote “run on the long road”

Quotes

“winning about effort” V. Carter

Team 6
Artifact

Notes

Prac. Facility

New indoor, outdoor facility

Statues

Joe Greene – past great

x

Cafeteria

Simple, clean, small

x

Exec Offices

Lots of open spaces to promote comm.

x

Trophies

Five Lombardi Trophies – prominent
placement
Hall of Fame wall – all players through
Steeler’s history that have made HOF

x

On display

On display

x

New, no stairs, huge banner

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

x

SDC

MW

x
x

WTT ENC OW

x

x

x
x

x

SDC

MW

WTT ENC OW
x

x

x
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Appendix H
Review of Literature
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Organizational culture is a relatively abstract concept that has yet to be examined
in the context of sport. The purpose of this review of literature is to give the reader a
primer on the many different aspects of organizational culture. The construct will not
only be defined, but the different methods of assessing organizational culture will be
discussed. Furthermore, the impact of leadership on organizational culture will be
examined, and the relationship between culture and performance will be explored. The
literature has been consistent on the existence of a relationship between culture and
performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007).
It is important to understand the above elements prior to examining the reasons
behind culture decline and, more importantly, the ways in which a “broken” culture
might be repaired. Throughout this process, a case will be constructed for the addition of
organizational culture awareness and culture change into the more traditional sport
psychology interventions.
Organizational Culture
The terms “culture” and “climate” are often used interchangeably, and there is
considerable confusion within the literature about what each of these constructs describe.
For example, McMurray (2005) stated that climate is a stable characteristic of a company
that distinguishes it and “embodies members’ collective perceptions about their
organization with respect to autonomy, trust, cohesiveness, support, recognition,
innovation and fairness” (p. 1). Unlike McMurray, Falcione and Kaplan (1984) posited
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that culture persists over time, while climate is a snapshot of the same elements at any
given moment in time. Climate is also thought to be quantifiable (measurable) while
culture is more qualitative.
Denison (1996) argued that culture and climate simply represent different
perspectives of organizational environments, and that they may not be truly different
concepts. For example, culture requires an emic perspective while climate requires an etic
perspective; culture requires qualitative analysis while climate requires quantitative
analysis; culture is underlying values and assumptions while climate is the surface
manifestations of those values and assumptions; and, culture is rich and dependent upon
an organization’s history, while climate is ahistorical in nature. Similar to Denison’s
perspective, and for the purpose of clarity within this literature review, the differences
between culture and climate lie with individual perception (Ashworth, 1985). Both
climate and culture reside on the same continuum; members are consciously aware of
climate, while culture is a phenomenon of unconscious beliefs.
In sport, organizational culture has not yet been examined. However, a similar
concept has - climate. Ames (1992) defined climate as the environment that a coach
creates within his or her team. Ames suggested that there are primarily two types of
climates: mastery or ego-involving. A mastery climate is one in which a coach defines
success as giving maximum effort, consistent skill improvement, and persisting through
adversity. In contrast, an ego involving climate is one in which athletes are encouraged to
compare themselves to one another, mistakes are punished, and winning is the primary
emphasis.
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Ames’ (1992) definition of climate is markedly different than Schein’s construct
of organizational culture, ostensibly due to the fact that Ames has studied climate only in
the context of the sport team. However, there are additional reasons for the differences.
For example, whether a coach creates a mastery or ego-involved climate primarily affects
the focus of the players. In contrast, organizational culture is more subtle and pervasive,
and impacts all members of an organization, regardless of job task or level. Secondly,
climate is learned primarily through dealing with an individual – the coach.
Organizational culture can be learned through the observance of how any member of an
organization deals with issues of external adaptation or internal integration. Finally, an
outsider would likely be able to determine what type of climate an athletic team has by
watching a single practice. Organizational culture is more subtle. Only a very perceptive
outsider would be able to determine the complexities of the values and underlying
assumptions that comprise an organization’s culture, and this would be a difficult task to
accomplish in a single day.
Smith and Smoll (1997) used Ames approach to climate to create Coach
Effectiveness Training (CET), a system to assist coaches increase awareness of their own
specific behaviors that lead to a mastery climate. These behaviors include reframing
“winning”, positive reinforcement, the establishment of norms which encourage athletes
to help and support one another, and involving athletes in decisions regarding team rules.
In one study, 31 little league baseball coaches were randomly assigned to either the
experimental group (received CET training) or the control group (no training). Results
indicated that CET trained coaches gave more reinforcement for effort, responded to
mistakes with encouragement, were better liked, and were rated as better teachers. More
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importantly, players had a significantly higher self esteem and lower dropout rate (5%)
than those in the control group (26%).
Despite a thorough review of literature and evidence of the positive impact of
specific interventions on sport climate, there is a dearth of published literature examining
organizational culture and sport. Lee, Wagstaff, Fletcher, and Hanton (2007) encouraged
the convergence of mainstream business literature and sport psychology literature. One of
the ten business dimensions Lee et al identified that needs to be explored in sport was
organizational culture. Lee and colleagues implied that discrepancies within an overall
culture might impose unnecessary demands on the athletes and therefore impact
performance.
While climate has been discussed in the context of sport, and culture has been
compared to climate, it is critical to clearly define organizational culture. Most sport
psychology consultants likely have only a vague idea of organizational culture of the
teams, departments and organizations they work for, as training in this area is not a part
of the traditional educational curriculum for sport psychology.
Organizational culture came into vogue in the early 1980s to explain the failures
of US companies relative to their Japanese counterparts (Schein, 1990). Perhaps the most
well-known scholar of organizational culture is Edgar Schein. Schein admits that culture
is a difficult construct to define, as it has its roots in sociology, anthropology, and
organizational behavior (Schein, 1992). Similar to Ashworth (1985), Schein claims that
climate is a “surface manifestation” of culture, which is defined as:
a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has
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worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
relation to these problems. (p. 12)
Schein (1990, 1992) identified three different levels of culture: observable
artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions. As the term implies, observable
artifacts are aspects of an organization that any outsider would easily be able to see. For
example, dress code, the manner in which individuals address one another (formally,
informally, etc.), and publicized mission statements are all considered observable
artifacts. The second level of culture, the shared values of an organization, is not as
easily observed. These need to be determined through interviews. For example, if
integrity is valued within a sales organization, multiple interviews would reveal this
through employees stated interactions with customers and co-workers. Interviews would
reveal that the employee finds it important to keep his/her word on deliverables to
customers. However, if money/status is the value, this likewise would be revealed
through interviews with subtle clues, including the lack of respect for another sales
person’s territory.
The third and perhaps most difficult level of culture to determine is the basic
underlying assumptions of an organization. These are typically unconscious and can only
be discerned through intense observations and in-depth questions (Schein, 1990).
Continuing with the examples above, if integrity is the value, an underlying assumption
may be that honesty leads to success, or that true success does not exist without honesty
within human interactions. Likewise, if money/status is the value, the underlying
assumption may be that competitive aggressiveness will drive individuals and the
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company to be as successful as they possibly can. Those that are not competitive and/or
aggressive will weaken the organization.
Research has indicated that culture has an impact on organizational performance
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992), employee behavior (Kilman, Saxton & Serpa, 1985), cohesion
(Gagliardi, 1986), employee turnover (Sheridan, 1992), job satisfaction (Lok &
Crawford, 2003) and self-esteem (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994). However, culture
can also impact communication barriers and power struggles (Kanter, 1983) and
resistance to change (Gagliardi, 1986).
Assessment of Culture
Schein (1990) pointed out that because of the largely unconscious nature of
culture, it is difficult to measure. The difficulty arises primarily because survey research
assumes knowledge of the correct dimensions, and is therefore largely inadequate as a
means of “measuring” culture. Additionally, analytical-descriptive research fragments
the holistic concept of culture; ethnographic and historical research is time consuming
and expensive; clinical descriptive (data gathered while a consultant is helping the
system) leaves out the breadth. Schein states that the best way to determine an
organization’s culture is through determining what layer is most prominent, conducting
interviews to determine values while looking for anomalies, and pushing past those
values to determine underlying assumptions. This process is most effective when the
interviewer has a combination of insider knowledge and outsider perspective.
However, all researchers do not agree that culture should not be assessed
quantitatively. Colyer (2000) compared the different cultures of five Australian sport
associations, using the Quinn Instrument II (Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991) as the quantitative
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measure. The Quinn Instrument II uses the Competing Values Framework (CVF) as its
theoretical basis. The CVF was developed in the early 80s, from an integration of theories
and factors that were thought to contribute to organizational effectiveness. The CVF
posits that most organizations can be assessed along two dimensions, each representing
competing methods to solving basic challenges that all organizations must overcome in
order to function.
The first dimension, or set of competing values, is an organization’s penchant for
encouraging centralized control over organizational processes, versus an organization’s
proclivity to value decentralization and flexibility. The second dimension is the
organization’s orientation towards its internal environment and processes versus its
orientation towards its external environment and relationships with outsiders.
To fully understand Colyer’s (2000) research, it is important to comprehend the
the four resultant quadrants of the CVF. Helfrich, Li, Mohr, Meterko, and Sales (2007),
describe these quadrants as:
1. Bureaucratic culture (Internal focus, emphasis on control). These organizations
adopt centralized authority over organizational processes, have respect for a
formal hierarchy, and adhere to rules. Stability and predictability are valued.
2. Team cultures (Internal focus, emphasis on flexibility): These organizations
encourage broad participation, teamwork and empowerment, and value human
resource development.
3. Entrepreneurial culture (External focus, emphasis on flexibility) These
organizations foster creativity and innovativeness and place a premium on growth
and expansion.
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4. Rational culture (External focus, emphasis on control): These types of
organizations are characterized by clarity of tasks and goals, with an emphasis on
efficiency and measurable outcomes.
These four cultures are prototypes, and organizations tend to have elements of each as
part of their overall culture. Each culture type is assessed by four questions using a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5. A graphical representation of the culture can be
created by placing the score for each culture type on a diagonal axis and connecting the
four resultant points, creating an object of varying size and shape. A larger object
indicates a stronger overall culture.
Due to a small response rate, Colyer (2000) was able to compare only three of the
five sport organizations’ cultures. For the four scales, Cronbach’s alpha were as follows:
team (.88), developmental (.86), bureaucratic (.58), rational (.85). The author suggests
that the CVF may be a good diagnostic tool to use along with qualitative methods to
assess culture.
Although Colyer (2000) found the use of the CVF adequate, Helfrich et al. (2007)
utilized factor analysis to assess whether the instrument was valid in the health care
industry. Analysis revealed a better fit for a two-factor model (parsimony) rather than the
classic four-factor CVF. The entrepreneurial, rational and team scales combined to form
one scale. Since their sample was non managers (N=77,776), their study raises questions
about the CVF’s usefulness in health care and amongst non managers.
The above analysis of the CVF indicates, as Schein (1990, 1992) suggested, that
when culture is assessed quantitatively assumed values may not accurately measure the
values that an organization deems important. The CVF inherently limits the types of
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cultures and values that an organization might embrace. Furthermore, a quantitative
assessment does not necessarily capture the underlying assumptions of the organization.
Although use of the Quinn Instrument II may provide an adequate starting point for
cultural diagnosis, in isolation it limits the potential depth of cultural analysis.
Organizational Culture Formation: The Impact of Leadership
With a working knowledge of organizational culture and its assessment, it is
important to explore how culture initially forms and is passed from generation to
generation. Schein (1983) posits that culture is a combination of the assumptions and
theories of the founder, along with what the organization learns from its own unique
experiences. Accordingly, there are five seemingly philosophical tenets from which a
culture paradigm is formed.
The first is the organization’s relationship to its environment (dominance,
submission, harmonizing, a niche, etc). The second tenet is the nature of truth within that
organization. This is determined through answering the question, “how is truth ultimately
determined?” The third tenet is the qualities of human nature within the organization. To
determine human nature, it is important to understand what it means to be human, and
what attributes are valued (aggressiveness, harmony, organization, creativity). The fourth
tenet is the nature of human activity which evolves from an organization’s collective
belief in what the right thing is for human beings to do. This is determined by the
assumptions of reality, the environment, and human nature. For example, the nature of
“human activity” is going to be markedly different within a non-profit organization than a
highly competitive sales organization. The final tenet revolves around the nature of
human relationships. This is dictated by an organization’s belief of the “right way” for
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people to interact with each other. To best understand this, it is important to assess how
power and love are distributed, and whether life is collaborative or competitive, based on
laws and regulation or on charisma.
These tenets are developed through what leaders role model, what they pay
attention to, and how they react to critical events. Schein (1990, 1992) believes that
culture is created around critical incidents. Specifically, the immediate next set of
behaviors after an incident begins to create a norm, through identification with leaders.
Additional methods in which a culture can be reinforced are through organizational
design, systems and procedures, physical layout and design, the stories, myths and
legends that are emphasized, and formal statements of organizational philosophies, such
as mission or vision statements (Schein, 1990).
Although Schein was convinced that leadership influenced culture, Sarros, Gray
and Densten (2002) attempted to determine the causal factor in the leadership-culture
relationship. They administered the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ Form
5x; Bass & Avolio, 1997) and the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP; O’Reilly,
Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991) to 1918 executives in Australia. The MLQ measures
elements of transactional and transformational leadership, such as idealized attributes,
idealized behaviors, inspirational motivation, and intellectual stimulation. The OCP
measures organizational culture orientations along eight factors, including innovation,
attention to detail, outcome orientation, aggressiveness, supportiveness, emphasis on
rewards, team orientation, and decisiveness.
Multiple regression analysis was used to determine if the above aspects of
leadership predicted the different elements of organizational culture, or whether aspects
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of culture influenced leadership. The authors found that different elements of leadership
had a moderate impact on culture, with a variance ranging from 14%-24%. Conversely,
culture had less of an impact on leadership, with the variance of 4%-10%.
When examining these findings in more detail, Sras and his fellow researchers
found that a transactional leadership style accounted for 24% of the variance of cultural
aspect of emphasis on rewards (i.e., fair behavior which rewards and praises good work
performance, and provides opportunities for professional growth); the leadership quality
of supportiveness accounted for 23% of the variance of the cultural aspect of inspirational
motivation; the leadership quality of innovation accounted for 20% of the variance of the
cultural aspect of both inspirational motivation and contingent reward; and the leadership
style of competitiveness accounted for 18% of the variance of the cultural aspect of
inspirational motivation and contingent rewards.
In summary, Sarros and his colleagues’ work largely supported the supposition of
Schein – that leadership leads to culture. However, their findings cannot be interpreted in
a dichotomous manner, as they also suggested that culture has an impact on leadership.
Additionally, the culture that leaders help to form is reinforced by the experience of the
organization and whether the leader’s way has been effective in the organization’s ability
to deal with crisis (Schein, 1983). For a successful first generation organization, one of
the main dilemmas is how to successfully transition the culture in a way that preserves it
and at the same time ensures that the organization remains adaptive to its alwayschanging external environments. This conscious dilemma implicitly implies that the
initial culture of an organization positively impacts the organization’s performance.
Culture and Performance
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This implicit implication of a definitive relationship between culture and
performance has been debated by scholars of organizational culture. Kotter and Heskett
(1992), widely seen as the preeminent experts on the relationship between culture and
performance, have made a compelling case that culture does impact performance. They
outline three general theories of culture: the strong culture, the strategically appropriate
cultures, and the adaptive culture.
Over the span of four years, Kotter and Heskett (1992) analyzed performance
metrics for hundreds of organizations. First, they classified each organization into one of
three culture types. The first of these, the strong culture, is one in which the organization
has an evident, notable style. In other words, employees are aligned and motivated to do
their jobs in a specific manner. These cultures are easily identifiable to the outside world,
as evidenced by the “IBM Way” in business, or the New York Yankees in sport where
athletes must adhere to a strict dress code and carry themselves professionally on and off
the field. To test the relationship between strong cultures and performance, Kotter and
Heskett (1992) administered culture strength indices and examined economic
performance measures for 207 organizations from a wide variety of industries and
locations. They found that there was a general positive correlation between strength of
corporate culture and market value (r = .26), net income growth (r = .46), and return on
average investment (r=.31). However, these correlations were relatively weak and lacked
consistency. For example, it is possible to have a strong culture with bad performance, so
a strong culture may include “dysfunctional elements” that may be a detriment to
performance. In fact, most of the organizations that had a strong culture but weak
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performance often had a prior history of success, indicating that the organization held
onto a culture past the time of its effectiveness.
The second culture type that was examined was the strategically appropriate culture,
or a culture that is effective only if it fits within its current internal and external
environment. For example, a culture with slow decision making and a lot of bureaucracy
would not be an appropriate fit for a dot com company in the Silicon Valley, where
change occurs rapidly. Only a culture strategically appropriate, or one that fits within its
current external environment, will facilitate a strong performance. Kotter and Heskett
(1992) selected 22 of the original 207 companies from 10 different industries, each of
which had outperformed the overall industry. Each sample company was matched with a
company that underperformed as compared with its industry.
The researchers then took a qualitative approach and interviewed members of all
organizations, questioning whether they thought their culture helped performance, hurt
performance, both helped and hurt it, had no impact on performance, and whether their
respective culture fit the market. To add further depth to their data, they had participants
answer the same questions using a Likert-type scale. Overwhelmingly, those in
companies that had lower performance felt that their company’s culture hurt their
performance and did not fit their industry, while those in higher performing organizations
felt their culture helped their performance and was a good fit for their industry. The main
criticism of this theory is that external environments change, and often the culture of a
company remains the same. When the culture-environment discrepancy grows,
performance may suffer.

Organizational Culture Change in Sport 82
The final culture theory type examined was the adaptive culture. The adaptive
culture takes into account environmental change. This type of culture helps members
anticipate and adapt to environmental change; the only cultures that will perform well are
those that continually and successfully adapt. As cited in Kotter and Heskett (1992),
Kilmann, Saxton and Serpa (1985) described and adaptive culture as one that:
entails a risk-taking, trusting, and proactive approach to organizational as
well as individual life. Members actively support one another’s efforts to
identify all problems and implement workable solutions. There is a shared
feeling of confidence: the members believe, without a doubt, that they can
effectively manage whatever new problems and opportunities will come
their way. There is a widespread enthusiasm, a spirit of doing whatever it
takes to achieve organizational success. The embers are receptive to
change and innovation. (p. 44)
This change-embracing culture must come from leadership, and the adaptive culture
must value leadership (Kotter, 1990). The leadership, in turn, must value the core
constituencies of the organization: customers, stockholders and employees. The adaptive
cultures theory states that the higher performing organizations values all three of the
constituents. Because the managers care deeply about the constituencies, they pay close
attention to them, their needs, and the environment. When changes amongst or within
constituents occur, managers are quick to spot the trend and make the appropriate
changes to align their strategy with the new conditions.
Using the same 22 organizations from the study above, Kotter and Heskett (1992)
asked the question “how much does the culture value excellent leadership from its
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managers?” using a Likert-scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). Higher performing firms
averaged 6, while lower performing firms averaged 3.9. Furthermore, higher performing
firms valued their customers (Mhigher = 6.0; Mlower = 4.6), employees (Mhigher = 5.8; Mlower
= 4.1) and stockholders (Mhigher = 5.7; Mlower = 3.9) significantly more than the lower
performing firms.
In summary, this information implies that there is lack of leadership directing an
organization’s focus on salient issues in lower performing organizations. Additionally,
this also may indicate that employees within these organizations who may be focused on
salient issues (customers, employees, stockholders) may feel that their actions will fail to
make a difference. More importantly, this information indicates that there is a positive
relationship between organizations that focus outwardly on customers and stockholders
and internally on employees and leadership.
Because each of the above studies is correlational in nature, it is difficult to say
that culture causes performance, or performance causes culture. Yet, through their
qualitative analysis, Kotter and Heskett (1992) make a strong case that a pattern of
success emerges when managers care about their constituencies, pay attention to them,
and quickly recognize when changes are occurring at those levels. They then use
leadership, which is highly valued, to drive changes (reduce costs, improve products,
culture modification) until they again have adapted to their environments.
By applying Kotter and Heskett’s concept of culture to professional sport
organizations, it is easy to identify franchises that neatly fit in the mold of each of the
three cultures. For example, the Oakland Raiders (2008) have a strong culture that
mirrors the identity of its owner, Al Davis. He has always been a maverick, often suing
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the league and picking up players that other teams have deemed as “problems”. He has
also stubbornly held on to his “long ball” philosophy, despite the major changes
occurring in the league at large with the embracement of the West Coast offense, zone
blitzes and salary caps. At one time, his strategy was successful. However, he has held
onto his philosophy, ignoring two of the three elements of his constituents: his fans
(customers) and his players and coaches (employees). Despite the Raiders strong culture,
the organization is largely ineffective in today’s NFL.
In summary, there seems to be a strong link between culture and performance. In
order to create or maintain an adaptive culture, the owner or general manager of a sport
organization must focus on core constituents: their employees (athletes and coaches),
their customers (fans), and their stockholders (owners). In doing this the team has a
greater chance of achieving success, as leadership will quickly recognize and adapt to
changes that are occurring throughout the league within which they compete.
When cultures go bad
Now that culture-performance link has been established, it is necessary to explore
why cultures go bad and the types of culture that do not facilitate successful performance.
Singh (2006) suggests that the average lifespan of an organization has been shrinking
steadily, and is now roughly 35 years. This lifespan is likely to shrink further in the near
future, as changes continue to occur at a faster pace.
Along with lifespan, there are four broad reasons why organizations eventually
become obsolete (Singh, 2006). For one, the organization is overwhelmed by external
changes. Often, the strategies that organizations implement become obsolete due to
external environmental changes. Whether the change revolves around consumer
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preference, the behavior of competitors, technology, or governmental policies, these
changes can be major and they can occur quickly. Secondly, inertia may hold
organizations to the formula of past success. Third, both hubris and complacency take
hold. Pride essentially blinds members to competitive pressures and changes to the
external environment. Finally, once an organization realizes that a major change is
needed, they underestimate the difficulty of implementing change. Instead, they try to
push ideas through resistance as quickly as possible, rather than empowering employees
and selling them on the idea that if the status quo is maintained, their organization will no
longer be relevant.
In her book The Change Masters, Kanter (1983) discussed organizations that were
close to becoming obsolete. She identifies the cultures existing within these companies as
“segmentalist”. A segmentalist culture is one in which barriers are placed, both
intentionally and inadvertently, between the different units of an organization. Once this
occurs, collaboration is reduced or eliminated, and power is concentrated amongst a few
individuals or levels. Once a segmentalist culture develops, little communication takes
place between departments, and the prime motivator for members is securing power for
themselves or their department. Because of this, each unit works solely through their
respective boss, causing “silos” to form throughout the company.
Within these organizations, management uses control rather than empowerment to
direct their employees. Often, elaborate bureaucratic processes develop, along with
centralized decisions and a one-way flow of communication (top-down). When
employees are not empowered, risk-taking is eliminated as there is a general intolerance
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of failure. This intolerance results in employees conforming to the status quo – which
may have been successful in the past but will eventually become ineffective.
Kanter (1983) takes the stance that it is necessary for any organization to innovate
and change – to keep up with both internal and external market factors. Within a
segmentalist organization, there are three factors that make innovation difficult. For one,
it is less likely that an innovator will overcome the barriers that inherently exist within
the organization. For example, an innovator may experience difficulty obtaining enough
power to even present an idea. Secondly, it is not likely that an innovation that does
make it will be taken advantage of by the particular unit within which it was developed.
After all, this could displace the current power structure. Finally, if an innovation does
stick, it is unlikely that a segmentalist organization will have the internal communication
networks to transfer the innovation throughout the company so that the entire
organization can reap the benefits of the change.
In addition to inherent challenges with innovation, two traps are common within
segmentalist organizations (Kanter, 1983). The first has been coined the “bureaucratic
trap”. This occurs when there is a sense of powerlessness, which generates the need to
defend one’s territory. Often times, this defense leads to an inherent resistance to other’s
good ideas. The second trap, the entrepreneurial trap, is the perceived need to be the
source of a good idea within an organization. This leads members to push their own ideas
forward and ignore others, to the detriment of the organization.
Other theories abound about dysfunctional cultures. In the popular trade book,
The Five Dysfunctions of Team, Lencioni (2002) develops a model in which each of five
dysfunctions builds upon one another until you have a thoroughly dysfunctional
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organization. The first dysfunction is an absence of trust, or an unwillingness to be open
with team members. Once this occurs, the second dysfunction, a fear of conflict,
develops. When conflict is absent, it becomes difficult to commit to an idea because few
have voiced their opinions, regardless of whether the opinions are filled with dissent or
agreement. The fourth dysfunction that naturally follows is an avoidance of
accountability. After all, if you do not fully commit to an idea, it is difficult to hold
yourself or your peers accountable. And finally, when there is little accountability, the
result is an inattention to results, which Lencioni claims occurs when team members put
individual needs and division needs above the collective needs and goals of the team.
Kanter’s (2004) work has supported Lencioni’s theory of team dysfunction. In her
book about leadership, confidence and the psychology of turnarounds, she says along
with a natural shelf life, denial can be a large virus that impacts organizations that are
accustomed to winning. It’s easy to deny that there is a problem and that the market may
have changed. Denial can erode what Kanter calls the three cornerstones of success:
collaboration, initiative and accountability. This denial may stem from dysfunctional
assumptions within the culture that “operate as silent filters of what is perceived and
thought about” (p. 78). Further confidence erodes when employees retreat to protect their
own “turf”, which can be considered their power, their direct reports or their own product
line. This cycle of decline is solidified when organizations begin to encounter “doom
loops”. Kanter (2004) defines doom loops as:
Decline generally does not stem from a single factor, but from an
accumulation of decisions, actions, and commitments that become
entangled in self-perpetuating system dynamics. Once a cycle of decline
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is established, it is hard to simply call a halt, put on the brakes and
reverse direction. The system has momentum. Expectations have
formed, and they can turn into a culture that perpetuates losing. (p. 95)
Kanter claims that when there are few resources or coping mechanisms for dealing
with problems within an organization, employees fall back on almost primitive selfprotective behavior. Nine common pathologies begin to unfold, as an emotional and
behavioral chain reaction: communication decreases; criticism and blame increases;
respect decreases; isolation increases; focus turns inward; rifts widen and inequities
grow; initiative decreases; aspirations diminish; negativity spreads.
Furthermore, similar to an ego oriented athlete who knows s/he can not win, an
environment is cultivated and reinforced that discourages employees from trying to
impact change. After all, why try to change a situation when the belief persists that there
will be no impact? In fact, Kanter (2004) believes that “sports teams may be relatively
simple examples, but the dynamics of losing streaks in sports illuminated issues of failure
in more complex systems” (p. 138).
Culture Change
Each of the authors in the above section agreed that when a culture goes bad,
change become necessary. These changes are often complex, difficult and take a
significant amount of time. In fact, an entire academic field, change management, has
evolved focusing on how to successfully create change within organizations. Although
that field focuses on implementing changes of process or technology, altering culture is
subtly different and places more emphasis on the human element.
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Culture change has its roots far before the advent of organizational psychology.
Phelan (2005) compares the eight-step process of organizational change developed by
Kotter and Heskett (1992) to the anthropologic concept of revitalization. Kotter and
Heskett’s model is as follows:
1. Initial Culture: The initial culture develops, which leads to success.
2. Aberrant behavior: New managers, not aware or in agreement with the existing
culture, exhibit behavior that conflicts with the established cultural norms or
vision (arrogance, lack of values, resistance to change).
3. New Leadership, New Vision: A new CEO is hired who identifies the crisis, and
develops a vision to lead the organization from that crisis.
4. Reorganization: This new leader maintains a high visibility and models the new
acceptable behavior.
5. Successful culture change: Because the new actions achieve desired results,
employees are motivated to change their behavior. Furthermore, norms and values
also begin to change.
In anthropology, the concept of cultural revitalization has many parallels. Cultural
revitalization is a “movement that involves establishing new religious or political
ideologies in societies that are threatened by cultural crisis” (p.49).
1. Steady state period – the existing culture operates in an acceptable manner.
2. Period of increased individual stress: Economic distress, epidemic, politics or war
is a catalyst that enlightens people that the traditional manner of dealing with
stress is no longer effective.
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3. Period of Revitalization: A prophet or visionary comes forth with a plan (often
given by a supernatural being) that presents a culturally relevant goal. This plan
includes communication, reorganization, adaptation, routinization, and finally a
new steady state.
It is evident that organizational cultural change is not a novel concept. It has its origins in
the larger cultural changes that have occurred throughout our history. Applying these
two models to professional sport, its easy to see how an organization can have prolonged
success followed by economic hardship, poor management, or the failure to deal with
external changes. Once this occurs, new ownership or management comes in with a
specific plan to make the team relevant again. A great example of this is the San
Francisco 49ers. Throughout the 80s and early 90s, they were arguably the most
successful team in the National Football League. Issues with their upper management and
ownership, and arrogance from their past success, left the franchise reeling, both
financially and from a coaching and talent standpoint. However, over the past five years,
a new general manager and coach have introduced specific goals under a comprehensive
plan in an attempt to make the team relevant again.
In the early 20th century, Kurt Lewin, a physicist turned psychologist, developed a
three-step model of change. Lewin believed that in order for successful systemic change
to occur, it is necessary to unfreeze the current system, make the change, and refreeze the
new system (Kent, 2001). However, most systems ignore the first and third steps. When
these steps are ignored, the change will most likely fail.
Schein (1990) asserts that Lewin’s three step process needs to occur in order to
successfully change culture. First, leaders need to “unfreeze” the present system by
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outlining and discussing impending threats to the organization if no change occurs.
Secondly, a new direction needs to be formalized along with a new set of assumptions.
This second step is the actual “change”. At times, it is necessary to inject outsiders into
the system who have not been acculturated by the past system. New rituals and artifacts
need to be created in order to emphasize the “new way”. Finally, members of the
organization need to be positively reinforced when their actions align with the new
assumptions, and punished when they adhere to old assumptions. In severe cases, groups
that hold tightly to the old culture need to be disbanded. This third step is “refreezing” the
new culture.
Not only do organizations inadvertently skip the “unfreeze” and “refreeze” steps,
but Kotter and Haskett (1992) assert that culture is difficult to change because both the
interdependence between and within levels of culture (i.e., values and behaviors), and the
interdependence between the culture and the power structure. Additionally, there is a
strong connection between human emotions and values. There are also multiple ways in
which a culture sustains itself and resists change. Examples of this are the stories that are
told repeatedly within organizations to remind members of the organization’s values. A
second example is the selection criteria used for new members. Wallach (1983) adds that
along with the organization, individuals applying for membership also attempt to ensure
that there is a culture match. Therefore, both the organization and the new members work
together to ensure that the culture remains the same.
Gagliardi (1986) suggests that there is a relatively simple explanation for the
strong resistance to culture change within an organization. When a culture change is
necessary, it is usually because the values and assumptions that were once effective in
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dealing with organizational crises are no longer effective. However, values and their
underlying assumptions are not open for discussion or criticism. Gagliardi posits that
there is a four stage process for ingraining these values. The first phase occurs when a
leader shares his/her vision. Typically, this vision is a set of beliefs including a causeeffect relationship. If the behaviors oriented by the basic beliefs lead to the desired
outcome, the belief is spread to all members of the organization and becomes a reference
point (phase 2). As the desired results continue to be achieved, the organization shifts its
focus from the effects, which provides “evidence of the validity of its belief” (p. 122) to
the cause, which remains prominent and becomes the ideal (phase 3). Finally the value,
which is now believed by all in the organization, is taken for granted and begins to orient
behavior (phase 4).
For example, if an owner of a new professional football team values experienced
talent above all else, s/he will hire a GM and coaches who also value talent. The team
will be built primarily through high-priced, established free agents. This initial team is
successful for the first year, and proceeds to the first round of the playoffs, far exceeding
expectations for any first year club in an established league. The value of building on
talent spreads to others in the organization, and the team continues to build utilizing high
priced free agents. Yet, salary cap restrictions, an aging roster, and a lack of chemistry
eventually collude and leave the team at the bottom of the standings. Despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the team continues to recruit talented free-agents,
as experienced talent has become an unquestioned ideological value despite current
performance indications to the contrary.
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Fortunately, the situation outlined above is not irrevocable. Gagliardi (1986) also
outlines three conditions for implementing culture change. First, there should be no
antagonism between new values an organization is trying to promote and the old values
an organization has held. Using the example above, it would be ineffective to say that
talent no longer matters - only character and chemistry matter. That antagonizes an
organization’s ideology. Rather, it would be more effective to ingrain the value of
instilling the new value that “we need to develop our own talent.” The second condition
for culture change is that the organization needs to collectively experience success in
exercising the new values. Accordingly, the organization that shifts values to developing
talent from within needs to experience improvements when using that strategy. Finally,
the leadership of an organization needs to promote a “mythical” interpretation of that
success.
In an attempt to better understand these concepts, Smith (2003) conducted a
survey study using 210 managers from different industries across North America.
Roughly 28% of the respondents indicated that their organizations went through some
type of culture change in the two years prior. Only 19% of these attempted changes were
rated as extremely successful. Ironically success was more likely when the sponsors
(supporters of the change) were officers other than the CEO or COO. Successful change
most strongly correlated with the following: the desired change was rewarded; the change
effort was kept small; a dedicated project team was assigned; there was apparent support
from a sponsor over the course of the project; and progress was tracked and publicized.
Conversely, the key correlates to failed culture change include the departure of the
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sponsor (r = - .58; p < .0005), key executives did not fully support the change (r = -.39; p
< .0005), and that the culture did not support the change (r = -.37; p < .0005).
Smith’s (2003) research paints a rather bleak picture of culture change, but also
provides a salient guide to successfully implementing culture change. Kanter (2004) takes
a more qualitative approach and examines change in “psychological” terms. Specifically,
she examines prolonged success in business, sport, and even at the level of government to
determine the qualities that bring about change. Kanter posits that confidence is the
cornerstone of healthy organizations. There are three primary elements to confidence:
accountability, collaboration, and initiative. The author defines accountability as an
environment in which there is nothing to hide. Individuals want to share information,
even negative information, because that could potentially strengthen the team. Individuals
and groups constantly seek feedback and self improvement. Collaboration is defined as
the desire to work with others. Initiative is defined as empowerment. Employees feel
empowered and that their opinions matter. Kanter (2004) believes that winning streaks
end when one of the three cornerstones erodes.
To go from a losing streak to a winning streak, Kanter believes that all major
turnarounds have multiple commonalities. For one, leaders must make a decision about a
situation that may have previously been ignored. In other words, all members of an
organization must face the facts, admit responsibility for a problem, develop clear
priorities and implement the means for clear performance feedback. “Ducking the facts
about performance for fear of being judged, criticized, humiliated, and punished
characterizes losing streaks, not winning streaks” (p.209). Secondly, it is necessary to
increase collaboration. In a losing streak, individuals’ confidence in one another is low.
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This must be restored, and this can be done through cultivating new ways to
communicate, new topics of conversation, and jointly carrying out important work. Third,
leaders must inspire initiative. This can be done through the empowerment of employees,
and holding the honest belief in people and the ability to make a difference. It is
important to note that culture change is not a goal in itself. It is a means to improve
performance, to start “winning” again.
As mentioned earlier, Kanter believes that sport teams may represent simple
examples of culture change. In her book Confidence: Leadership and the Psychology of
Turnarounds, she outlines the transformation of the Philadelphia Eagles. This started
with owner Jeffery Lurie, who purchased the Eagles for $185 million. At the time of his
purchase, the Eagles had a long history of losing. Lurie catalogued the key ingredients for
a turnaround: a superb leader/coach; a franchise quarterback; an excellent player
personnel department; an outstanding practice facility; and a new stadium. At first, Lurie
hired Ray Rhodes, a disciplinarian. “Disciplinarian coaches, like tough corporate bosses
brought into tighten things up, often wear out their welcome relatively quickly and
players begin to just tune them out” (p.152). After Rhodes departed, Lurie hired Andy
Reid, and the culture change continued. Together, Lurie and Reid formed a player’s
committee, built a new practice facility with no pillars for open environment, installed a
cafeteria in central location, orchestrated film night for families of employees and
players, and put tributes to Martin Luther King, Mother Teresa, and Jonas Salk in the
lobby to signify the new values of the organization which went well beyond football.
Over the past ten years, the Eagles have been one of the most successful organizations in
the NFL.
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This story speaks to the importance within the field of sport psychology to have a
working understanding of organizational culture, and the factors that influence whether a
culture is assisting in the success of an organization or contributing to its decline. In
working with leadership (owners, general managers) to systematically create a culture
that is conducive to success, a sport psychology consultant can have a much greater
impact than if s/he worked with a limited number of athletes on that team.
Kanter believes that leaders have a huge impact on the ability of their
organizations to make changes, as they are the ones that have the greatest impact on
culture. “The fundamental task of leaders is to develop confidence in advance of victory,
in order to attract the investments that make the victory possible – money, talent, support,
loyalty, attention, effort or people’s best thinking.” (p.19)
Conclusion
In an article by Chad Ford in ESPN.com evaluating the draft prospects of Yi Lang
from China, Ford had this to say: “After seeing international players such as Yao Ming
and Bargnani shine in a good situation and Darko Milicic suffer in a bad situation, they
know that style of play, coaching, organizational culture and the opportunity to play will
ultimately determine whether Yi fulfills his enormous potential” (Ford, 2007). This
suggests that, along with some general mangers, even sportswriters understand how
important organizational culture may be to the success of an athlete.
This review of literature has explained the constructs of climate and
organizational culture, discussed the challenges in assessing organizational culture,
outlined the role that leadership plays in developing and maintaining the culture, and
linked the constructs of culture to performance in both business (empirically) and sport
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(analogously). Additionally, this paper has demonstrated the challenges of effectively
changing culture once it is no longer conducive to successful performance. Most
importantly, this review has highlighted the lack of research and information that exists
about organizational culture in professional and collegiate sport. There is a wealth of
information within business literature and, arguably, professional sport organizations are
simply businesses with a very unique product: a team.
It would serve sport psychology consultants to examine sport organizations’
cultures in order to determine how an athlete’s overall environment, not simply his or her
thought processes about that environment, may impact performance. If culture has an
impact on enjoyment, commitment, motivation, and performance within business, surely
the sport psychology field could benefit in learning how to impact organizational culture
in sport. In seeking this understanding, it makes sense to begin an initial exploration into
organizational culture of professional athletics.
Specifically, leaders of professional sport organizations, filling both ownership
and general management positions, are often seen as change agents. A new owner or
general manager often has a dramatic impact on the on-field success of the teams that
they oversee. Kanter (2004) clearly demonstrated how an owner had a significant impact
on the success of a professional football team. Casual sport fans around the country have
opinions on whether their team’s owner/general manager is conducive to success, or
rather act as a barrier to success. A contemporary example of this phenomenon is Isiah
Thomas’ disastrous tenure as general manager/coach of the New York Knicks basketball
team. Thomas is widely criticized for handicapping that franchise, both financially and
from a talent standpoint, for years to come (Ford, 2008).
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According to Schein (1990, 1992), this cultural exploration can be accomplished
through qualitative methods. As mentioned earlier, owners and general managers are
often credited for improving the fortunes of sport organizations. Through the interview of
leaders who have successfully turned their respective franchises around, different
elements of leadership and culture can be extracted that may have helped facilitate
success. Questions regarding the change process, artifacts, values, and the underlying
assumptions of an organization can be asked that might enlighten some of the processes
and substance of successful culture change. For example, it would be beneficial to
determine the values and underlying assumptions of the organization when it was
struggling, how the new values and assumptions differ, and the type of process was
implemented to bring about the transition. In clarifying the methods of successful sport
executives, we can utilize their experience to take the first steps toward understanding,
and eventually manipulating, organizational culture within sport organizations.
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